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FAR FROM FAIR,  
FARTHER FROM EFFICIENT: 
THE FTC AND THE  
HYPER-FORMALIZATION OF  
INFORMAL RULEMAKING
Cooper J. Spinelli*
Introduction
In the 1969 “Nader Report” on the Federal Trade Commission (FTC 
or Commission), Ralph Nader characterized the FTC as “a self-parody 
of bureaucracy.”1 In some ways, despite ample time for a new act, the 
*  American University Washington College of Law, J.D. Candidate, 2014; U.C. Berkeley, B.A., 
2010. I would first like to thank Theresa Amato for alerting me to this issue. I would also like to 
Introduction .............................................................................................129
I. The History of FTC Rulemaking: From An Exemplar of 
“Agency Capture” To A Victim Of Its Own Success ...............137
A. An Independent Agency: Antitrust Roots and  
the Wheeler–Lea Act ..............................................................137
B. The Nadir and Renewal ...........................................................138
C. A Pyrrhic Victory .....................................................................138
D. Congress Seeks Greater Control over  
the “Great National Nanny” ...............................................139
E. The Nineties to the Present ....................................................142
II. Debilitation Through Deliberation? ...........................................143
A. APA v. Mag-Moss ......................................................................145
B. “The Full Panoply of Procedural Devices” and its 
Effects ........................................................................................147
1. Imbalance of Participatory Capacity and Intentions .148
2. Making Some Rules More Effective Than Others ........150
3. Opportunity Lost .................................................................152
C. Delivering the Message? Guidelines and Enforcement 
for Green Marketing, Food Advertising, and More ........153
III. The FTC “on Steroids” ...................................................................158
A. Additional Congressional Controls ..................................159
B. Executive Control ....................................................................160
C. “Hard Look” ..............................................................................162
D. “The APA is Not Radical” ......................................................163
IV. What Is To Be Done? ......................................................................164
A. Status Quo .................................................................................164
B. Proposal: Dual Track ...............................................................168
Conclusion ................................................................................................169
130 Far From Fair, Farther From Efficient
play proceeds with farce and a similar cast of characters—powerful 
industries,2 a hamstrung regulator,3 and millions of vulnerable 
consumers.4
The FTC’s mission is to promote the efficient functioning of the 
marketplace by seeking to protect consumers from unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices and to promote vigorous competition.5 Like many 
other agencies, the FTC has three primary modes of shaping policy: 
thank Professor Jeffrey Lubbers for his valued guidance and inspiring contributions to the field 
of administrative law. I must also thank Jay, Eileen, Grams, and Gary for their good fortune, 
counsel, love, and support, and especially my late-grandfather, a resolute opponent of unfairness, 
inefficiency, and inertia. Of course, I am so grateful for my loving parents, Roberta and Joie—my 
original editors and champions of academic diligence. Finally, I would not be here today without 
my fiancé, my khorshid, Dana.
1  Ralph Nader, Preface to Edward F. Cox et al., ‘The Nader Report’ on The Federal Trade 
Commission vii (1969); see also Miles W. Kirkpatrick, ABA Report on the FTC: Consumer Protection 
or Consumer Exploitation?, 3 Antitrust & Econ. L. Rev. 57, 60 (1969–1970) (finding that the FTC ‘s 
consumer protection efforts were “inadequate” and “piecemeal”).
2  See Internet Advertising Revenues Set First Quarter Record at $8.4 Billion, Iab.net (June 11, 2012), 
http://www.iab.net/about_the_iab/recent_press_releases/press_release_archive/press_release/
pr-061112; Joe Weisenthal, Corporate Profits Go Parabolic, Businessinsider.com (May 31, 2012, 
5:32 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/corporate-profits-go-parabolic-2012-5; Shawn Tully, 
Fortune 500: The Year of Living Profitably, Cnnmoney.com (May 7, 2012, 12:00 PM), http://finance.
fortune.cnn.com/2012/05/07/500-intro/. 
3  See The FTC’s Enforcement Tools against Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices in Financial Products 
& Services and other Sectors Before the S. Subcomm. on Consumer Prot., Product Safety, & Ins., 111th 
Cong. 6 (2010) (statement of Dee Pridgen) (noting that the FTC has reverted to issuing non-
binding guidelines); H.R. 2309: The Consumer Credit and Debt Protection Act Before the Subcomm. 
on Commerce, Trade, & Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. 3 
(2009) (statement of Kathleen E. Keest on behalf of National Consumer Law Center) (explaining 
how the FTC now can virtually only rely on “retrospective” or reactive regulation, e.g., filing 
complaints); Interview by John Villafranco with David Vladeck, former Director of Consumer 
Protection, Federal Trade Commission, (April 2010), available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/Apr10_VladeckIntrvw4_14f.authcheckdam.pdf 
(lamenting that the lack of general APA rulemaking authority prevented the FTC from effecting 
reform on a “wholesale basis”); Telephone Interview with David Vladeck, former Director of the 
Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of Consumer Protection (Oct. 3, 2012) (admitting that the 
lack of APA rulemaking authority hamstrings the FTC). 
4  See Jane M. Monroe, Consumer Fraud In The United States 2 (1st ed. 2010) (listing findings 
of study: 30.2 million consumers victims of fraud in 2005); See Financial Services and Products: The 
Role of the FTC in Protecting Consumers, Part II Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, & Transp., 
111th Cong. (2010) (Chairman, John D. (Jay) Rockefeller IV) (“With family budgets stretched thin, 
foreclosures up and unemployment still sky-high, unscrupulous business practices continue to 
target consumers directly when they can least afford it.”); Interview by John Villafranco with 
David Vladeck, former Director of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission, (April 2010), 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/Apr10_
VladeckIntrvw4_14f.authcheckdam.pdf (contending that with APA rulemaking authority the FTC 
could have spared many consumers from losing thousands of dollars in scams). 
5  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a), 57a (2012); What We Do, Fed. Trade Comm’n (last visited Jan. 18, 2014), 
http://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do. 
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adjudication,6 enforcement, and rulemaking.7 With some over-
simplification, these modes are functional equivalents to the roles of 
the judiciary, the executive, and the legislature.8 Generally, an agency 
can proactively make rules pursuant to its originating statute, or can 
issue rules at the behest of Congress on a more ad hoc basis.9 
Unlike most agencies, however, the FTC—since 1975—cannot 
make rules pursuant to the “informal” rulemaking provisions in § 553 
of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) unless authorized by 
Congress.10 In 2010, when Congress was crafting “Dodd-Frank,” FTC 
Commissioners, scholars, and consumer advocates implored Congress 
to restore APA § 553 rulemaking powers permanently to the FTC.11 By 
one vote, Congress declined.12
6  Although adjudication and enforcement are distinct functions, this Article uses them 
interchangeably because the FTC subsumes both functions under the umbrella term of 
enforcement. Moreover, both of these functions tend to merge. For instance, the FTC frequently 
obtains consent orders or settlement agreements through administrative processes, e.g., the 
Commission issues an “administrative complaint” that often results in a formal hearing before an 
FTC Administrative Law Judge that can be appealed to the Commission itself. If, however, these 
orders are violated, then the Commission must seek judicial enforcement through a federal court 
order that imposes civil penalties or consumer redress. See generally A Brief Overview of the Federal 
Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, Fed. Trade Comm’n (July 2008), 
http://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority.
7  See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 
14–15 (1947) (stating that rulemaking is essentially legislative in nature); Ronald A. Cass et al., 
Administrative Law Cases And Materials 380, 384, 426 (6th ed. 2011) (discussing the two main 
functions of agencies and noting that the Court has held policymaking to be appropriately the 
province of informal rulemaking).
8  See Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions—A Foolish 
Inconsistency?, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 488, 492–93 (1987).
9  See Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards 
of Smoking, Trade Regulation Rule, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324 (1964) (invoking power, for the first time, 
to issue substantive rules under its enabling statute); Mortgage Assistance Relief Services, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 75,092 (Dec. 1, 2010) (to be codified at 16 CFR pt. 322) (promulgating a MARS rule pursuant 
to CREDIT Card Act). 
10  See 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(2) (2012).
11  Consumer Credit and Debt: The Role of the FTC in Protecting the Public Before Subcomm. on 
Commerce, Trade, & Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111th Congr. 21–23 
(2009) (statement of The Federal Trade Commission); The FTC’s Enforcement Tools against Unfair 
and Deceptive Trade Practices in Fin. Prods. & Services and other Sectors Before the S. Subcomm. on 
Consumer Prot., Product Safety, & Ins., 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Dee Pridgen); H.R. 2309: 
The Consumer Credit and Debt Prot. Act Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade & Consumer Prot. 
of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. 8–9 (2009) (statement of Kathleen E. Keest 
on behalf of National Consumer Law Center); Financial Services and Products: The Role of the FTC 
in Protecting Consumers, Part II Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, & Transp., 111th Cong. 
5 (2010) (statement of Edmund Mierzwinski, Consumer Program Director, U.S. Public Interest 
Research Group); David A. Balto, Bring the FTC into the 21st Century, The Hill (Mar. 4, 2009 3:07 
PM), http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/95947-bring-the-ftc-into-the-21st-century. 
12  See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at scattered provisions of the U.S. Code (Supp. IV & V 
2011, 2012)). With regulated industries mounting a concerted lobbying campaign against it, the 
attempt to abrogate Mag-Moss rulemaking procedures, despite the House’s success in including 
the provision in its conference report and the valiant efforts of Senator Jay Rockefeller, died in 
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In light of this development, this Article will examine the effects 
of the status quo, the consequences of restoring APA rulemaking 
powers, and how this issue speaks to the role of rulemaking in the 
administrative state.
Section 553—the foundational vehicle for rulemaking, known as 
both informal rulemaking and notice-and-comment procedure—sets 
forth the minimum process an agency must afford the public when 
promulgating rules: post a notice of a proposed rule in the Federal 
Register (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking or NPRM), solicit comments 
from the public, and issue a concise general statement of basis and 
purpose accompanying the final rule.13 When Congress enacted the 
APA in 1946, it felt that this streamlined yet inclusive procedure was 
superior to a more adversarial trial-type proceeding.14
Partially concerned with the proliferation of the “New Deal” 
agencies,15 Congress saw the APA as a “compromise measure.”16 
That is, Congress designed it to afford “uniformity and fairness in 
administrative procedures without at the same time unduly interfering 
with the efficient and economical operation of government.”17 Scholars 
and jurists from across the political spectrum have recognized that 
the notice-and-comment process allows for relative flexibility that 
can help “foster better government” by setting policy prospectively 
and expeditiously, thereby striking a reasonable balance between 
fairness and efficiency.18 In contrast to adjudicative measures, informal 
the Senate when some senior Democratic Senators succeeded in repelling it from the Senate’s 
conference report. Senate Passes Wall Street Reform Conference Report, ANA, http://www.ana.net/
content/show/id/1885 (last visited Jan. 17, 2014); Telephone Interview with David Vladeck, former 
Director of the Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of Consumer Protection (Oct. 3, 2012). 
13  See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (c) (2012).
14  See H.R. Rep. No. 93–1107, at 45–46 (1974); Joanna Grisinger, Law in Action: The Attorney General’s 
Committee on Administrative Procedure, J. of Pol’y Hist. 379, 401 (2013) (noting that the Attorney 
General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure, tasked with helping draft the APA, “found 
that formal hearings and adversarial proceedings were poorly suited to agency operations, and 
that even procedures lifted from the legislative context proved awkward in the administrative 
context” and “Agency representatives reported that hearings simply allowed unhappy parties 
to voice their grievances”); James Hart, Final Report of the Attorney General’s Committee on 
Administrative Procedure, 35 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 501, 503–504 (1941).
15  Alan B. Morrison, The Administrative Procedure Act: A Living and Responsive Law, 72 Va. L. Rev. 
253, 260 (1986). 
16  Alan B. Morrison, Administrative Agencies Are Just Like Legislatures And Courts—Except When 
They’re Not, 59 Admin. L. Rev. 79, 81 (2007). 
17  Id. 
18  See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 543 (1977) 
(upholding agency decision not to hold formal hearings, and in the process, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist praised the virtues of informal rulemaking: “agencies . . . would undoubtedly adopt 
full adjudicatory procedures in every instance. Not only would this totally disrupt the statutory 
scheme, through which Congress enacted ‘a formula upon which opposing social and political 
forces have come to rest,’ but all the inherent advantages of informal rulemaking would be totally 
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rulemaking can offer holistic treatment to market disorders—with 
considerable public input—without having to rely on “whack-a-
mole” triage that is less publicly accountable and, in some ways, more 
inequitable for regulated entities.19
For the FTC and other stakeholders, these benefits remain elusive.20 
Despite the D.C. Circuit upholding the FTC’s authority to create 
substantive rules in 1973, Congress passed the Magnusson-Moss 
Warranty, Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act (Mag-Moss), 
which sanctioned the FTC’s power of substantive rulemaking.21 But 
in doing so, Congress established a “hybrid” rulemaking system in 
an effort to provide more “due process” safeguards than § 553 of the 
APA, but less than would be in the adjudicatory context.22 Congress 
augmented the procedural “safeguards” over the next two decades; 
most significantly in 1980 and 1994.23 Consequently, if the FTC now 
wishes to promulgate, substantively amend, or repeal binding trade 
rules proscribing certain “unfair or deceptive acts or practices,” it must 
identify the practice as “prevalent” before adhering to an eighteen-step, 
trial-like process that jettisons all the advantages of informal rulemaking 
in exchange for exceedingly expensive glacial deliberation.24 
lost.”) (emphasis added); United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co. 410 U.S. 224, 245–46 (1973) (basing 
its decision, which construed the language of a provision authorizing the Interstate Commerce 
Commission to act ‘after hearing’ as being satisfied by what was in effect notice-and-comment 
procedure, on the “recognized distinction in administrative law between proceedings for the 
purpose of promulgating policy-type rules or standards, on the one hand, and proceedings 
designed to adjudicate disputed facts in particular cases on the other”); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 
Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 Admin L. Rev. 59 (1995); Alan B. Morrison, The 
Administrative Procedure Act: A Living and Responsive Law, 72 Va. L. Rev. 253 (1986); Antonin Scalia, 
Back to Basics: Making Law Without Making Rules, 5 Reg. 25, 26 (1981).
19  See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Back to Basics: Making Law Without Making Rules, 5 Reg. 25, 27 (1981) 
(“if one considers not what agencies do, but how they do it, those who are regulated generally 
prefer the participation and certainty provided by rulemaking.”); infra notes 211–13, 265, 270 and 
accompanying text.
20  See Interview by John Villafranco with David Vladeck, former Director of Consumer Protection, 
Federal Trade Commission, 10 (April 2010), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/Apr10_VladeckIntrvw4_14f.authcheckdam.pdf.
21  See Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183–93 (codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 57a & 2301–12 (2012)).
22  Dee Pridgen & Richard M. Alderman, Consumer Protection and The Law § 12:10 (2011).
23  Id. 
24  See 15 U.S.C. § 57a; Consumer Credit and Debt: The Role of the Federal Trade Commission in 
Protecting the Public Before Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, & Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on 
Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. 21 n.51 (2009) (statement of The Federal Trade Commission) 
(describing how it took the FTC ten years to promulgate the Credit Practices Rule); Trade 
Regulation Rule, Funeral Industry Practice, 47 Fed. Reg. 422,260 (codified at 16 CFR pt. 453) (Sept. 
24, 1982) (devoting two pages to discussing the rule’s progression, which produced, through 
cross-examination alone, 14,719 pages of transcript, and approximately 4000 additional pages of 
exhibits); B. Boyer, M. Bowers, D. Edelman, B. Cartwright & H. Toiv, Phase II Report on the 
Trade Regulation Rulemaking Procedures of the Federal Trade Commission 73 (Report to the 
Administrative Conference of the United States, June 1980) (finding that—in the late 1970s—the 
expense of a Mag-Moss rulemaking could, without adjusting for inflation, easily exceed a million 
dollars); cf. Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Testing the Ossification Thesis: An Empirical 
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Indeed, it is a process that can take up to over a decade merely 
to amend a rule.25 To put this in perspective, when granted authority 
to promulgate new rules under § 553, the FTC’s promulgation can 
often take only a few months, even when providing opportunity for 
public input beyond notice-and-comment.26 Whatever may have 
been the true motives of Congress in passing Mag-Moss, it cited the 
FTC’s difficulties in protecting the consuming public, over-reliance on 
adjudicative measures like cease-and-desist orders, and a lack of public 
understanding regarding agency intention.27 
Almost four decades later, those good intentions have helped 
entrench, if not exacerbate, the very problems Congress sought 
to ameliorate.28 Finding the Mag-Moss process to be prohibitively 
profligate, the FTC has refrained from proactively initiating rulemaking 
proceedings, instead favoring enforcement actions and non-binding 
guidelines.29 In the last two decades, Congress has at times granted 
the FTC—largely as a result of FTC lobbying efforts—the power to 
promulgate rules through notice-and-comment procedure, but only on 
Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume and Speed, 1950–1990, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1414, 1457–58 
(2012) (setting the average time of FTC rulemaking as a metric of ossification). 
25  See Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising, 72 Fed. Reg. 15,444, 
15,445 (Mar. 30, 2007) (codified at 16 C.F.R. 436, 437) (stating that the rule’s amendment proceeding 
began in 1995 and an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking was published in 1997; the final 
amendment was promulgated in 2007); Consumer Credit and Debt: The Role of the Federal Trade 
Commission in Protecting the Public Before Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, & Consumer Prot. of the 
H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. 21 n.51 (2009) (statement of The Federal Trade 
Commission) (describing how it took the FTC ten years to promulgate the Credit Practices Rule); 
Panel on Formal/Hybrid Rulemaking, ABA Section of Administrative and Regulatory Practice Rulemaking 
Institute 5 (June 2, 2010) (Statement of Jeffrey S. Lubbers) (noting that some Mag-Moss rulemaking 
efforts, such as regulations governing mobile homes and hearing aid sales, took anywhere from 
eight to ten years and were ultimately unsuccessful) (on file with author); Thomas O. McGarity, 
Some Thoughts on the Ossification of Rulemaking, 41 Duke L.J. 1385, 1389–90 tbl.1 (1992) (noting that 
the average time for completion under Mag-Moss was over five years). 
26  See, e.g., Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,888, 59,889–90 (Nov. 3, 
1999) (noting that an NPRM was published on July 20, 1999 and the FTC, responding to the 
“particular interest among commenters in the issue of how to obtain verifiable parental consent 
under the Rule,” conducted a 32-panelist public workshop that included industry representatives, 
privacy advocates, and consumer groups); FTC Contact Lens Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 40,482, 40,482 
(July 2, 2004) (codified at 16 C.F.R. 315) (informing that the Commission, pursuant to the Fairness 
to Contact Lens Consumer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7607 (2012), which exempted the FTC from Mag-Moss 
procedure when prescribing rules under the Act, published an NPRM on February 4, 2004, a 
mere four months before it issued the final rule). Although the nature of these rules may not have 
generated the same political backlash as those targeting the television advertising industry or 
financial sector, the issue of government-imposed restrictions on privacy and children’s autonomy 
is certainly more controversial than the regulation of hearing aids, which occupied ten-years of 
the FTC’s time only to never materialize into a rule.
27  See H.R. Rep. No. 93–1107, at 7712, 7729 (1974); Reuel E. Schiller, Rulemaking’s Promise: 
Administrative Law and Legal Culture in the 1960s and 1970s, 53 Admin. L. Rev. 1139, 1168 (2001).
28  See supra note 3; infra notes 211–13, 270.
29  Pridgen, supra note 22, at § 12:14.
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a temporary ad hoc basis.30
Scholars have partially addressed this issue through what is known 
as the “ossification” thesis: cumbersome procedures, “hard look” judicial 
review, and probing executive oversight have notably diminished the 
pace and volume of rulemaking.31 Some of the ossification scholars’ 
prescriptive proposals have discussed guidance documents as “de-
ossifying” methods, while their diagnostic analyses tend to focus more 
on the judiciary’s role in regulatory ossification.32 However, some 
evidence suggests that agencies such as the FTC cannot adequately 
address the pernicious practices of some market actors through 
adjudication and voluntary guidance documents alone.33 Nor does the 
FTC’s remedy lie in the softening of judicial review.34 Therefore, this 
Article exclusively focuses on the effects of congressionally-imposed 
strictures, and uses the case of the FTC to argue that in the context of 
administrative rulemaking, efficiency should not be sacrificed at the 
altar of formality. 
Part I of this Article explores the history of the FTC, the antecedents 
of the status quo, and recent developments. Part II provides a snapshot 
of consumer affairs and assesses how the FTC’s hyper-formalized 
rulemaking process specifically affects its ability to protect consumers, 
stabilize the market, and provide clarity and notice to regulated 
entities. Part III addresses the arguments against the restoration of APA 
rulemaking powers to the FTC and surveys additional judicial, executive, 
30  Id.; see Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 4580 (Jan. 29, 2003) (16 C.F.R. pt. 310); Mortgage 
Assistance Relief Services, 75 Fed. Reg. 75,092 (Dec. 1, 2010) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 322).
31  See generally Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 
41 Duke L.J. 1385 (1992) (propounding the “ossification” theory by examining the rulemaking 
activity of the EPA, OSHA, and FTC). 
32  See id.; Charles H. Koch, Jr., 1 Admin. L. & Prac. 329 § 4:30 (3d ed. 2012) (noting that 
commentators lay a “good deal of blame on overly intrusive judicial review”); Richard J. Pierce, 
Rulemaking Ossification is Real: A Response to Testing the Ossification Thesis, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 
1493, 1496 (2012) (“the long period before an agency issues an NPRM is primarily attributable 
to judicial decisions that impose heavy burdens on agencies, well beyond those required by 
statute.”); Frank B. Cross, Pragmatic Pathologies of Judicial Review of Administrative Rulemaking, 78 
N.C. L. Rev. 1013, 1021 (2000) (arguing that the foremost reason for rulemaking ossification has 
been judicially-imposed analytical requirements); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify 
Agency Rulemaking, 47 Admin. L. Rev. 59, 65 (1995) (“[T]he judicial branch is responsible for most 
of the ossification of the rulemaking process.”).
33  See, e.g., David Gibson, Awash in Green: A Critical Perspective on Environmental Advertising, 22 
Tul. Envtl. L.J. 423 (2009) (concluding that guidelines have not been as effective in correcting 
deceptive marketing claims as rules could be). 
34  See The Federal Trade Commission’s Enforcement Tools against Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices 
in Financial Products & Services and other Sectors Before the S. Subcomm. on Consumer Prot., Prod. 
Safety, & Ins., 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Dee Pridgen) (“The Federal Trade Commission’s 
work to protect consumer in the marketplace could be significantly enhanced if Congress were 
to grant the Commission the authority to use APA informal rulemaking procedures in all cases 
under its general authority.”). 
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and legislative features that already operate as administrative checks. 
Finally, Part IV analyzes the status quo in relation to the normative role 
and conception of the administrative state.
In sum, this Article argues that through the hyper-formalization 
and judicialization of the rulemaking process,35 Congress has created 
a burdensome, superfluous check on administrative authority that 
harms consumers, sows uncertainty among market actors, and furthers 
a paradigmatic shift towards an inert administrative state. Accordingly, 
Congress should reconsider restoring § 553 of the APA as the minimal 
procedural standard because, while it is far from perfect, it is not far 
from fair.
Alternatively, this Article concludes by proposing a modest reform 
that is consistent with the purpose of the APA, recommendations of 
academia and the Administrative Conference of the United States 
(ACUS), and Mag-Moss.36 Specifically, Congress could allow Mag-
Moss to operate on a dual-track system where interested parties debate 
and attempt to influence the substance of the proposed rule through 
traditional notice-and-comment procedure. Concurrently, the trial-type 
components of Mag-Moss procedure would remain compulsory for 
“adjudicative fact” questions, if they arise in a particular rulemaking. 
Professor Kenneth C. Davis, one of the principal drafters of the APA, 
analogized such questions to those that a jury would consider, such as: 
who did what, where, when, how, why, with what motive or intent.37 
Such facts are to be distinguished from “legislative facts,” which 
constitute “general fact[s] on which all legal institutions predicate 
rules of law.”38 By re-calibrating the judicial procedures of Mag-Moss 
35  See Martin Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 Va. L. Rev. 447, 483 (1986) (using judicialization 
in the rulemaking context). 
36  See Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (quoting the 1947 
Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act which stated that, “the object of 
the rule making proceeding is the implementation or prescription of law or policy for the future, 
rather than the evaluation of a respondent’s past conduct. Typically, the issues relate not to the 
evidentiary facts, as to which the veracity and demeanor of witnesses would often be important, 
but rather to the policy-making conclusions to be drawn from the facts”); Richard J. Pierce, Seven 
Ways to Deossify Rulemaking, 47 Admin. L. Rev. 59, 64 (1995) (“the legislative history of FTCA 
indicates that Congress intended to confer a right of limited cross-examination only with respect 
to some issues of adjudicative fact.”); Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS), 
Recommendation 72-5, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability, 38 Fed. 
Reg. 19,782 (1973) (recommending that Congress should never require trial-type procedures for 
resolving questions of policy or of broad general fact); infra note 113 (excerpting the Senate and 
House reports concurrence on the purpose of cross-examinations in FTC informal rulemaking—
resolving questions of adjudicative fact). 
37  Kenneth Culp Davis, Richard J. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise § 7.7, 341 (3d ed. 1994) 
(writing that in theory, the FTC is already only supposed to limit cross-examination to question of 
adjudicative fact, but this is not borne out in practice). 
38  Id. at 322 (describing legislative facts also as “highly imperfect understandings of complicated 
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to serve its inherent function—the resolution of factual, not policy, 
issues—affected parties can avail themselves of procedural protection 
if necessary, while not unduly ossifying the execution of sound policy.39 
I. The History of FTC Rulemaking: From An Exemplar of 
“Agency Capture”40 To A Victim Of Its Own Success
In the mid-twentieth century, both rulemaking and the FTC 
were considered relatively innocuous, immaterial, or repositories 
of squandered potential.41 By 1980, however, many attacked both as 
representing the unmitigated dangers of “Big Government.”42 Today, 
the opprobrium for rulemaking and the FTC has subsided somewhat, 
but the greater insouciance to the import of their shared history 
portends an uncertain future. 
A. An Independent Agency: Antitrust Roots and  
the Wheeler–Lea Act
Congress established the FTC in 1914 as an independent agency, 
empowering it to prohibit “unfair methods of competition” in the hopes 
of supplementing antitrust laws.43 Sponsors of the FTC Act spoke of the 
need for “’expertise’ and the corresponding necessity for ‘insulation’ 
from ‘political influence.’”44 The mandate was soon expanded when 
the FTC and the courts acknowledged the causal relationship between 
consumer protection and competition.45 Writing for the Supreme Court 
majority in Federal Trade Commission v. Winstead Hosiery Co.,46 Justice 
Brandeis upheld an FTC cease-and-desist order on a falsely labeled 
good, reasoning that deceiving consumers hurt the honest competitor.47 
Within little more than a decade of Winstead, Congress passed 
the Wheeler-Lea Act in 1938, which expanded the FTC’s objective to 
include the proscription of “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”48 The 
Bill’s Senate sponsor, Burton Wheeler (D-MT), noted in the course of 
relationships”).
39  Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers, Inc., 627 F.2d at 1163.
40  In the field of administrative law, “capture” occurs when an agency is unduly influenced 
by the very groups or industries it is charged with regulating. See generally Rachel E. Barkow, 
Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Agency Capture through Institutional Design, 89 Tex. L. Rev. 15 (2010).
41  See Schiller, supra note 27, at 1146, 1150; Nader, supra note 1.
42  See Richard A. Harris & Sidney M. Milkis, The Politics of Regulatory Change: A Tale of 
Two Agencies 191 (2d ed. 1996); Schiller, supra note 27, at 1154.
43  Pridgen, supra note 22, at § 8:2.
44  Cass, supra note 7, at 63.
45  Pridgen, supra note 22, at § 8:2.
46  258 U.S. 483, 493 (1922).
47  See Pridgen, supra note 22, at § 8:2.
48  Pridgen, supra note 22, at § 8:2 (2011).
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debate on the legislation, “Congress is not interested in whether John 
Smith lost some money as the result of the advertising complained of, 
but the question is whether or not the general public has been deceived 
or injured by reason of it.”49
It was not until 1964, that the Commission first asserted its 
authority to issue binding substantive rules, pursuant to its enacting 
statute, when it promulgated the Cigarette Rule.50 The decision to turn 
to binding trade rules largely arose from the cumbersome cease-and-
desist process and the dissatisfaction with voluntary guidelines.51 This 
assertiveness, however, was atypical for a period marked by profound 
agency capture.52 
B. The Nadir and Renewal
By 1969, the FTC was widely criticized as lethargic, inept, and 
nepotistic.53 The FTC was accused of obsessing over inconsequential 
technicalities, propping up competitors,54 failing to establish priorities, 
consciously declining to enforce, and general complacency.55 Within a 
few years, however, the cumulative force of practitioner, scholarly, and 
consumer criticisms, along with a change in administrations, seemed 
to cure the Commission’s sclerotic state.56 Throughout the next decade, 
the FTC initiated a flurry of rules relating to children’s advertising, 
credit practices, food advertising, funeral practices, health spa services, 
hearing aids, mobile home warranties, over-the-counter drugs, used 
cars, and vocational schools.57 
C. A Pyrrhic Victory
The advent of FTC rulemaking followed growing consternation 
among judges regarding agencies’ excessive reliance on adjudicative 
methods of regulation, and relative neglect of rulemaking.58 In the 
49  Harris, supra note 42, at 146.
50  Trade Regulation Rule for the Prevention of Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices in the Sale of 
Cigarettes, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324 (1964). 
51  See Cass, supra note 7, at 387. This decision coincided with a general and momentous shift away 
from adjudications to an embrace of rulemaking in administrative law. Antonin Scalia, Vermont 
Yankee: The APA, The D.C. Circuit, and The Supreme Court, 1978 Sup. Ct. Rev. 345, 376.
52  See Nader, supra note 1. 
53  Id. 
54  Nader, supra note 1.
55  Kirkpatrick, supra note 1 (finding that the FTC‘s consumer protection efforts were “inadequate” 
and “piecemeal”); Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 47, 61–82 
(1969) (criticizing the FTC for using consumer protection as a pretext for propping up competitors). 
56  Harris, supra note 42, at 165–167.
57  Pridgen, supra note 22, at § 12:10; Harris, supra note 42, at 181.
58  See, e.g., Schiller, supra note 27, at 1148–52 (citing Judge Friendly’s Oliver Wendell Holmes 
Lecture in 1962 where he admonished the administrative state for its dearth of clear standards 
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seminal 1973 case, National Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. Federal Trade 
Commission, the D.C. Circuit also expressed this view in upholding the 
FTC’s authority to issue substantive rules.59 The court’s reasoning is 
worth quoting in full: 
Thus there is little question that the availability of 
substantive rule-making gives any agency an invaluable 
resource-saving flexibility in carrying out its task of 
regulating parties subject to its statutory mandate. 
More than merely expediting the agency’s job, use of 
substantive rule-making is increasingly felt to yield significant 
benefits to those the agency regulates. Increasingly, courts 
are recognizing that use of rule-making to make 
innovations in agency policy may actually be fairer to 
regulated parties than total reliance on case-by-case 
adjudication . . . .60
Just two years later, Congress expressly authorized the FTC to issue 
substantive rules, while conferring additional regulatory abilities.61 
However, despite the protestations of the Commission that it had 
and would continue to judiciously and fairly exercise its procedural 
discretion under the APA,62 Congress saw fit to saddle the Commission’s 
newly-approved legislative powers with judicial-like procedures. 
That is, Congress required that the FTC grant oral hearings where 
participants would be allowed to present evidence, cross-examine 
witnesses, and adduce rebuttal testimony.63 Interestingly, Congress 
was ostensibly reacting to a 1969 ABA commission that described 
incipient symptoms of agency “capture.”64 Congress therefore hoped 
that imposing trial-type procedures would facilitate the participation 
of public interest groups.65 
D. Congress Seeks Greater Control over  
the “Great National Nanny”
Of the nineteen major rules and amendments proposed by the FTC 
after the passage of Mag-Moss, only seven were completed, averaging 
a completion time of over five years, compared to the general pre-Mag-
and encouraged a shift away from policymaking through adjudication to policymaking through 
rulemaking; “if the apparati of government had fallen into a malaise, rulemaking was a solution”). 
59  482 F.2d 672, 697–98 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
60  Id. at 681–683 (emphases added).
61  15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–12 (2012).
62  See H.R. Rep. No. 93-1107, at 7737 (1974); 15 U.S.C. § 57a.
63  15 U.S.C. § 57a(b), (c); H.R. Rep. No. 93-1107, at 7728 (1974).
64  Harris, supra note 42, at 173.
65  Id. 
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Moss completion time of one to two years.66 Of course, Mag-Moss did 
not solely cause the protraction of the rulemaking process.67 By 1981, 
the dogged consumer advocate and FTC Chairman, Michael Pertschuk, 
was no longer steering FTC policy, and the Reagan “Revolution,” 
marked by its general aversion to regulation, was afoot.68 Nevertheless, 
ACUS, which remained relatively restrained in its criticism of Mag-
Moss, attributed the problem, in part, to the implementation of “broad 
procedural rights.”69 
Perhaps more than any single event, it was Chairman Pertschuk’s 
decision to take on the advertising industry that not only resulted 
in the foisting of more procedural fetters, but also indicated that 
Congress’s grievances stemmed from the substance of FTC rules, not 
the procedure.70 By the mid-seventies, a growing number of parents, 
psychologists, and politicians had expressed concern about the impact 
of television on young children’s perceptions, beliefs, and behavior.71 
Several congressional committees held hearings, and at Pertschuk’s 
confirmation hearing, Senator Warren Magnuson (D-WA) urged 
him to focus on children’s advertising.72 In 1978, the FTC presented 
several options for comment by the public. In addition to alternative 
approaches, such as limitations on the frequency of advertisements 
66  Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 Duke L.J. 1385, 
1388–90 (1992).
67  Harris, supra note 42, at 191–192.
68  Id. at 188.
69  ACUS, Recommendation 79-1, Hybrid Rulemaking Procedures of the Federal Trade 
Commission 9, 44 Fed. Reg. 38,817 (July 3, 1979); see ACUS, Recommendation 80-1, Trade 
Regulation Rulemaking Under the Magnusson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission 
Improvement Act 5, 45 Fed. Reg. 46,772 (July 11, 1980) (“Congress should not ordinarily require, 
for agency rulemaking, procedures in addition to those specified by § 553 of the Administrative 
Procedure Act, although the agencies should have the discretion to utilize them.”); id. at 7 
(separate statement of Kenneth Culp Davis) (criticizing ACUS for not repudiating the use of cross-
examination). 
70  See S. Rep No. 96–500, at 2, 4 (1979) (prefacing the proposal of the new restrictions with a 
long discussion of the children’s advertising event; characterizing the proposals as a means 
to “minimize these problems of confusion and contention”); The Federal Trade Commission’s 
Enforcement Tools against Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices in Financial Products & Services and 
other Sectors Before the S. Subcomm. on Consumer Prot., Product Safety, & Ins., 111th Cong. 4–5 (2010) 
(statement of Dee Pridgen) (noting that Congress responded to the FTC’s proposed rule to ban 
children’s advertising by passing new restrictions in 1980); Harris, supra note 42, at 190–191 
(arguing that Pertschuk’s decision to take on children’s advertising was the breaking point, but 
congressional and industry opposition had been building before Pertschuk’s tenure). 
71  See Proposed Trade Regulation Rulemaking and Public Hearing on Children’s Advertising, 43 
Fed. Reg. 17,967, 17,968 (April 27, 1978) (disclosing that several groups petitioned the Commission 
to regulate children’s advertising, including, Action for Children’s Advertising, Consumer’s 
Union of America, Committee on Children’s Television, and the Center for Science in the Public 
Interest); Cass, supra note 7, at 462 (6th ed. 2011); Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic 
Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. 
Pol. Econ. 765, 778 (1983).
72  Cass, supra note 7, at 462.
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directed at very young children, the Commission’s central proposal 
included a categorical ban for any product that was directed to or 
seen by a “significant proportion of children who are too young to 
understand the selling purpose or otherwise comprehend or evaluate 
the advertising.”73
The advertising industry’s reaction was apoplectic,74 and the 
Washington Post derided the FTC as the “great national nanny.”75 
Promptly thereafter, the national trade associations of advertisers, 
advertising agencies, and toy manufacturers sued the FTC when 
Pertschuk, supported by his four colleagues, refused to remove 
himself from the rulemaking proceeding after publicly criticizing 
children’s advertising.76 After the D.C. Circuit rejected the advertisers’ 
attempts to disqualify Pertschuk,77 Congress passed another Federal 
Trade Commission Improvement Act in 1980, which, among other 
things, explicitly forbade the Commission from regulating children’s 
advertising.78 The Senate Report took care to voice its disconcertion 
with the FTC’s alleged attempt to broaden the definition of “unfairness” 
in justifying the regulation of children’s advertising.79 In particular, 
the Senate rejected the very premise of the action, namely, that the 
disparity in sophistication and power between an advertiser and a 
child is unfair.80 
The upshot was characterized by Pertschuk as a “triumph of business 
in diverting public attention and congressional outrage from consumer 
injury to business’s hardships at the hands of the regulators.”81 The Act 
required advance notice of proposed rulemaking, a preliminary and 
final regulatory analysis, prohibitions on ex parte contacts between 
the rulemaking staff and the commissioners, and limitations on public 
73  Proposed Trade Regulation Rulemaking and Public Hearing on Children’s Advertising, 43 
Fed. Reg. 17,967, 17,969 (April 27, 1978). The central proposal also included a ban on televised 
advertising for sugared products directed to children and a requirement that televised advertising 
for sugared food products directed to a “significant proportion of older children be balanced by 
nutritional and/or health disclosures funded by advertisers.” Id.
74  Cass, supra note 7, at 465.
75  Financial Services and Products: The Role of the Federal Trade Commission on Protecting Consumers, 
Part II Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Prot., Product Safety, & Ins. of the S. Comm. on Commerce, 
Science & Transp., 111th Cong. 7 (2010) (statement of Linda A. Woolley Executive Vice President, 
Government Affairs Direct Marketing Association).
76  Cass, supra note 7, at 465.
77  See Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
78  See 15 U.S.C. § 57a(h).
79  S. Rep. No. 96-500, at 2 (1979) (“The Commission apparently endorsed a broad and virtually 
unbounded definition of ‘unfairness‘ in the Federal Trade Commission Act in initiating the 
children’s television advertising proceeding.”).
80  Id. 
81  Pridgen, supra note 22, at § 12:12. 
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funding of rulemaking participants.82 The Act also established that any 
FTC rule would be subject to a 90-day congressional review period and 
could be vetoed by a joint resolution of both houses, a provision the 
Supreme Court subsequently overturned as unconstitutional.83 
Before the end of Pertschuk’s tenure in 1981, the Commission 
indicated its willingness to apply, and subject itself to, internal 
restrictions by issuing a policy statement that established a tripartite 
test for the FTC to deem any act or practice “unfair”: (1) it must be 
substantial; (2) it must not be outweighed by any countervailing 
benefits to consumers or competition; and (3) it must be an injury that 
consumers themselves could not reasonably have avoided.84
Often finding substantial countervailing benefits to competition,85 
the FTC, under newly Reagan-appointed leadership, spent most of the 
decade withdrawing or repealing rules, sparking renewed criticisms 
from consumer protection groups and the ABA.86 Nevertheless, in 
1994, Congress passed amendments mandating that the FTC find 
a practice “prevalent” before it initiated rulemaking proceedings.87 
Congress emphasized that the FTC should not regulate “isolated” 
or “insignificant” violations, and should only find prevalence if it 
issued several cease-and-desist orders or had “other information” that 
indicated a pattern of unlawful conduct.88 The statute also codified the 
Commission’s policy statement that established a three-part test, which 
must be satisfied before finding an act or practice unfair.89
E. The Nineties to the Present
Non-binding guidelines and enforcement actions have defined 
the FTC’s activity during the last twenty years.90 For the first time in 
almost two decades, the FTC started setting policy through guidelines, 
82  See Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat. 374 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 57a(b)(2)(A), (j), 57b-3 (2012)).
83  Pridgen, supra note 22, at § 12:12.
84  Id. at Appendix 9.
85  Harris, supra note 42, at 204 (“the increased role of economic analysis throughout the agency 
was a critical factor in the commission dropping or curtailing many pending rules, as well as 
preventing the initiation of ambitious programs in the area of consumer protection.”). 
86  See Annual Report of the FTC 1 (1981), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/reports_annual/annual-report-1981/ar1981_0.pdf (remarking that “the Commission 
transferred resources from broad industry-wide projects to more precisely defined and 
manageable case-enforcement activities”); Pridgen, supra note 22, at § 12:13; cf. Harris, supra note 
42, at 193 (citing a Wall Street Journal editorial celebrating the “FTC Metamorphosis” from its 
activist role in the 1970s). 
87  Pub. L. No. 103-312, § 5, 108 Stat. 1691 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 57a(b)).
88  Id. 
89  Id. § 9 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45); Harris, supra note 42, at 330–31 (describing the 
Act as a compromise between business and public-interest advocates). 
90  See Pridgen, supra note 22, at §§ 12:8, 12:14; Cass, supra note 7, at 387.
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which are considered “policy statements” under the APA and are thus 
not subject to Mag-Moss’s procedural restrictions.91 As an auxiliary 
regulatory method, FTC has issued several rules, but only pursuant to 
a particular law where Congress temporarily allowed the Commission 
to promulgate a specific rule under § 553 of the APA.92 Consequently, 
rules like the Telemarketing Sales Rule (TSR) and the Mortgage 
Assistance Relief Services (MARS) Rule took just one and two years to 
complete, respectively.93 
During the last two years, much of the FTC’s rulemaking has 
been confined to issuing technical amendments to existing rules, 
substantively amending guidelines, and finalizing rules, such as the 
MARS Rule, that were products of specific congressional mandates.94 
In 2010, the FTC issued a substantive amendment to the TSR, but 
because the Commission promulgated that rule under notice-and-
comment procedure, it was able to substantively amend it the same 
way.95 Overall, enforcement through adjudications and consent orders 
has comprised the predominant regulatory activity of the FTC.96 
II. Debilitation Through Deliberation?
Congress’s transmutation of the FTC rulemaking process has, at 
least for the time being, undoubtedly paralyzed the FTC’s ability to 
make rules.97 
While it may not be readily apparent that the practical absence of 
independent rulemaking vitiates the Commission’s effectiveness, it is 
clear that scholars have long acknowledged the inherent advantages of 
forging policy through rulemaking, and rulemaking’s ability to fairly 
and efficiently carry out an agency’s purpose in a way that adjudication 
cannot.98 Recognizing the benefits of rulemaking relative to adjudication, 
91  See Pridgen, supra note 22, at § 12:14. Nor are guidelines required to be issued through § 553 
notice-and-comment procedure. Nevertheless, the FTC issues its guidelines using notice-and-
comment. See Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims; Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 63,552 (Oct. 15, 2010). 
92  Id. 
93  Mortgage Assistance Relief Services, 75 Fed. Reg. 75, 092 (Dec. 1, 2010) (to be codified at 16 
C.F.R. pt. 322); Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 4580 (Jan. 29, 2003) (16 C.F.R. pt. 310). 
94  See Article history of Federal Trade Commission, rules and proposed rules, Fed. Reg., https://
www.federalregister.gov/articles/search?conditions%5Bagency_ids%5D%5B%5D=192&conditio
ns%5Btype%5D%5B%5D=RULE&page=2&quiet=true. 
95  Telemarketing Sales Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 48,458 (Aug. 10, 2010) (16 C.F.R. pt. 310).
96  See Cass, supra note 7, at 387.
97  See Telephone Interview with David Vladeck, former Director of the Federal Trade 
Commission’s Bureau of Consumer Protection (Oct. 3, 2012).
98  See, e.g., Nat’l Petroleum Refiner’s Ass’n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 697–98 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. 
denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974) (Wright, J.) (“[U]se of rulemaking by the Commission is convincingly 
linked to the goals of agency expedition, efficiency, and certainty of regulatory standards . . . .”); 
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moreover, has not exclusively been within the purview of liberal 
academia. Eminent conservative jurists such as Justice Scalia and former 
Chief Justice Rehnquist have heeded the utility of notice-and-comment 
procedure.99 Conversely, guidelines do not seem to hold comparable 
levels of approval.100 Although they provide the industry some notice, 
guidelines are not as effective in inducing general compliance.101 As a 
result, the FTC has recently adopted a more formidable enforcement 
strategy that has, in some instances, yielded new policy without the 
notice or clarity that would accompany a rulemaking.102 Finally, if the 
FTC continues to only promulgate rules when Congress grants it APA 
procedural powers, then in certain situations the FTC will have to let 
systemic unfair or deceptive practices fester while Congress amasses the 
votes to pass remedial legislation.103 Such was the case with the efforts 
to render relief in the mortgage arena during the Great Recession.104 
While Congress did ultimately authorize the FTC to forgo Mag-
Moss to pass the MARS Rule, the same congressional amenability to 
dispensation in special instances of new rulemaking does not appear 
to extend to substantive amendments to rules passed under Mag-Moss 
Richard J. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise § 6.8 (5th ed. 2010); Arthur Earl Bonfield, State 
Administrative Policy Formulation and the Choice of Lawmaking Methodology, 42 Admin. L. Rev. 121, 
122–36 (1990); Andrew P. Morriss et al., Regulation by Litigation, 9 Engage 109, 110 (2008) (stating 
that, although it is not beyond reproach, rulemaking has several advantages over policymaking 
approaches primarily defined by litigation); cf. Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law 
Treatise 448 (2d ed. 1978) (describing “administrative rulemaking as ‘one of the greatest 
inventions of modern government’). But see Glen O. Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: 
Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
485 (1970). 
99  See infra notes 119–127 and accompanying text. 
100  See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 Duke 
L.J. 1385, 1441–43 (1992) (proposing guidelines as a possible solution, but ultimately concluding 
that great reliance on guides could lead to arbitrary decisionmaking); Gibson, supra note 33, 
at 440 (concluding that “’Green Guides’ fail to adequately regulate the increasing problem of 
‘greenwash’ in advertising’). 
101  Gibson, supra note 33, at 440 (concluding that “’Green Guides’ fail to adequately regulate the 
increasing problem of ‘greenwash’ in advertising”). Indeed, the mere consideration of rulemaking 
can have a conforming effect. See Annual Report of the FTC 16 (1978), available at http://www.
ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports_annual/annual-report-1978/ar1978_0.pdf (citing a 
Washington Post report that the ABC network curtailed its advertising aimed at children by 20% 
simply in response to the FTC’s staff proposal to ban or limit television advertising aimed at 
children).
102  Id.
103  Interview by John Villafranco with David Vladeck, former Director of Consumer Protection, 
Federal Trade Commission, (April 2010), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/publishing/antitrust_source/Apr10_VladeckIntrvw4_14f.authcheckdam.pdf; Telephone 
Inter view with David Vladeck, former Director of the Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of 
Consumer Protection (Oct. 3, 2012).
104  Mortgage Assistance Relief Services, 75 Fed. Reg. 75,092 (Dec. 1, 2010) (to be codified at 16 
C.F.R. pt. 322).
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procedure, such as the Credit Practices Rule.105 Save for one instance,106 
Congress has not disencumbered the FTC from making substantive 
amendments to “Mag-Moss rules” using § 553, and the FTC seems 
wanting in the willingness or resources necessary to use Mag-Moss to 
make such amendments.107
A. APA v. Mag-Moss
To better appreciate the differences between APA and Mag-
Moss procedure, an enumeration of the latter’s requirements is 
instructive: (1) if the Commission identifies an unfair or deceptive act 
or practice it must issue cease-and-desist orders or collect information 
indicating a widespread pattern; (2) the Commission must also make a 
determination whether the act or practice is prevalent; (3) the FTC must 
publish an advance notice in the Federal Register, briefly describing 
the area of inquiry, the intended objectives, and possible regulatory 
alternatives; (4) the Commission must also submit advance notice to 
the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and 
to the House Committee of Energy and Commerce; (5) the FTC then 
publishes initial notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register 
specifically stating the text of the rule, including any alternatives that 
the Commission proposes to promulgate, and the reasons for the 
proposed rule; (6) the FTC receives comments; (7) the FTC publishes 
final notice identifying disputed issues and setting hearing sites and 
dates; (8) each interested person who desires to avail himself or herself 
of the procedures notifies the presiding officer in writing; (9) the 
presiding officer identifies groups of persons with the same or similar 
interests in the proceeding; (10) the FTC conducts a hearing with a 
presiding officer, which includes oral and documentary presentations 
of evidence, in addition to cross-examination; (11) the FTC allows 
for a post-hearing rebuttal period; (12) the FTC provides a presiding 
officer report; (13) the FTC provides a Bureau of Consumer Protection 
(BCP) staff report; (14) the FTC provides public comments on the 
presiding officer and BCP reports; (15) the Director of the BCP makes 
final recommendations; (16) the FTC allows for oral presentations by 
105  Telephone Interview with David Vladeck, former Director of the Federal Trade Commission’s 
Bureau of Consumer Protection (Oct. 3, 2012); Margot Saunders, Nat’l Consumer L. Ctr., 
Time to Update the Credit Practices Rule: CFPB Should Modernize FTC Rule Addressing 
Abusive Creditor Collection Practices (2010), available at http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/
debt_collection/credit-practices-rule-update.pdf.
106  12 U.S.C. § 5519(d) (2012); Telephone Interview with David Vladeck, former Director of the 
Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of Consumer Protection (Oct. 3, 2012) (stating the FTC 
believes Dodd-Frank granted it APA power to amend the Used Car Rule). 
107  Telephone Interview with David Vladeck, former Director of the Federal Trade Commission’s 
Bureau of Consumer Protection (Oct. 3, 2012) (declining to comment on any plans to amend 
Credit Practices Rule).
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interested persons; (17) the Commission holds meetings to consider 
the rule; (18) the FTC publishes a final rule and statement of basis and 
purpose.108 
A critical piece in this cadre of procedural encumbrances is the use 
of cross-examination for issues of legislative fact.109 Because virtually 
every rule is based on myriad contestable legislative facts, permitting 
cross-examination on each would likely de-incentivize an agency from 
rulemaking.110 Despite some efforts of Congress and the FTC, this is 
exactly what has occurred.111 While the text of Mag-Moss requires 
cross-examination on disputed issues of material fact,112 Conference 
Reports on the Statute have construed ’material fact’ to mean only 
issues of specific fact in contrast to legislative fact.113 Naturally, the FTC 
incorporated this distinction in its procedural rules,114 which could have 
significantly mitigated the cost and delay of Mag-Moss rulemaking.115 
However, the presiding officers (who are independent of the FTC) 
have resisted complying with this qualification.116 Consequently, the 
unbounded application of cross-examination, like other adjudicative 
procedures, creates inefficiency and potential for abuse, which have 
compelled the FTC to effectively desert a fundamental regulatory tool 
that now bears no resemblance to the tool’s moniker—rulemaking.117 
It is axiomatic that efficiency is one of the hallmarks of informal 
rulemaking under the APA.118 In 1981, Justice (then Professor) Scalia 
108  15 U.S.C. § 57a(b)–(c); ACUS, Recommendation 79-1, Hybrid Rulemaking Procedures of the 
Federal Trade Commission 9, 44 Fed. Reg. 38,817 (July 3, 1979).
109  See Kenneth Culp Davis, Richard J. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise § 7.7 (3d ed. 1994).
110  Id. (describing it as a “terrible waste of time” that would convert informal rulemaking into 
formal rulemaking). 
111  Id. (contending that because of the cost and delay of cross-examination, the FTC has nearly 
abandoned its use of rulemaking as a regulatory tool). 
112  15 U.S.C. § 57a(c). 
113  S. Rep. No. 1408, at 7765 (1974) (Conf. Rep.); H.R. Rep. No. 93-1107, at 7728 (1974) (“Cross-
examination is not required regarding issues in rulemaking proceedings which are not issues of 
fact. Examples of such issues are matters of law or policy or matters whose determination has 
been primarily vested by Congress in the Federal Trade Commission.”).
114  16 C.F.R. § 1.13(d)(5)(A) (“an issue for examination including cross-examination, or the 
presentation of rebuttal submissions, is an issue of specific in contrast to legislative fact.”). 
115  See Kenneth Culp Davis, Richard J. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise § 7.7 (3d ed. 1994).
116  Id. (declaring that Congress’s experiment with limited cross examination has failed, and that 
ALJs seem unable or unwilling to distinguish between adjudicative and legislative fact). 
117  Id.
118  See Alan B. Morrison, The Administrative Procedure Act: A Living and Responsive Law, 72 Va. L. 
Rev. 253, 255 (1986); Antonin Scalia, Back to Basics: Making Law Without Making Rules, 5 Reg. 25, 26 
(1981); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 Admin. L. Rev. 59, 59 
(1995); cf. Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Colo., 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) 
(Holmes, J.) (“when a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people it is impracticable that 
every one should have a direct voice in its adoption. The Constitution does not require all public 
acts to be done in town meeting or an assembly of the whole . . . there must be a limit to individual 
argument if government is to go on.”). 
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asserted that, without question, the greatest advantage of the APA for 
agencies was its relative lack of demanding restrictions.119 Scalia did 
warn that organizations with substantial public constituencies could 
exploit rulemaking opportunities that allowed everyone to participate, 
thereby “inject[ing] political calculations” into “those agency decisions 
that should be made on a technical basis.”120 Tellingly, however, 
Scalia was only expressing concern for exploitation of a rulemaking 
process that merely allowed for the submission of public comments, 
not an eighteen-step process that allowed for virtually a full-scale 
trial.121 In fact, the latter elicited a slightly more pointed analysis from 
Scalia three years prior, when he opined that it was an “unfathomable 
prescription” and part of a “statutory Babel” that evinced a “devil-
may-care attitude about departing from the APA” and a “profound 
ignorance concerning just what is being departed from.”122 Although 
Scalia was not necessarily averse to congressional control over agency 
autonomy and was disturbed by the proliferation of rulemaking, he 
acknowledged that “interest groups” opposed to FTC rules succeeded 
in commandeering the legislative reins to attain through procedural 
impositions what they could not otherwise.123
Writing for the majority in the 1978 case of Vermont Yankee 
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,124 
Justice Rehnquist was less equivocal in discussing the APA and 
the advantages of informal rulemaking.125 He held that “[a]bsent 
constitutional constraints or extremely compelling circumstances the 
‘administrative agencies’ should be free to fashion their own rules of 
procedure and to pursue methods of inquiry capable of permitting 
them to discharge their multitudinous duties.”126 While Rehnquist was 
speaking in the context of judicial, not congressional, interference with 
administrative procedure, his message was clear: “conduct[ing] all 
rulemaking proceedings with the full panoply of procedural devices 
normally associated only with adjudicatory hearings” would subvert 
the inherent advantages of informal rulemaking.127 
119  Antonin Scalia, Back to Basics: Making Law Without Making Rules, 5 Reg. 25, 26 (1981).
120  Id. 
121  Id. 
122  Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, The D.C. Circuit, and The Supreme Court, 1978 Sup. 
Ct. Rev. 345, 387 (commenting on the Consumer Product Safety Act and the FTC Improvement 
Act of 1975).
123  Id. at 402, 407. 
124  435 U.S. 519, 543 (1978).
125  See id.
126  Id. 
127  Id. at 547. Of course, then Justice Rehnquist was opining against the utility and providence 
of affording additional procedures to interested parties from a position generally opposed to 
extensive government regulation of industry. 
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B. “The Full Panoply of Procedural Devices” and its Effects
The subversive effects of Mag-Moss can be observed, in part, 
through the following ways. First, Mag-Moss provides regulated 
entities more opportunities to delay or skew the outcome in a way that 
the beneficiaries of regulation cannot.128 Second, by having to wait for 
Congress’s permission to use APA procedures, the FTC is deprived 
of the rapidity necessary to stem the damage wrought by unfair or 
deceptive practices.129 Third, the profligacy of Mag-Moss procedure has 
likely contributed in deterring the FTC from substantively amending 
the Credit Practices Rule to respond to novel deceptive practices.130 
1. Imbalance of Participatory Capacity and Intentions
In theory, attempts at increasing public accessibility of a process 
governed by unelected regulators seem consistent with democratic 
ideals and efforts to empower citizens.131 Practically, the theory runs into 
at least one problem: it falsely presupposes fairly matched participants 
and intent of both parties to develop the underlying factual issues in 
good faith. 
For the targets of a regulation, the societal good that the regulation 
may produce rarely exceeds the expense of compliance with that 
regulation.132 Therefore, the regulatory targets usually have an interest in 
protracting the process of writing rules with “which they will someday 
have to comply.”133 Moreover, because the cost of paying attorneys and 
experts to attack the proposed rule is generally less than the cost of 
compliance, regulated industries can allocate considerable resources 
to dilatorily prolonging implementation of a rule by challenging the 
underlying administrative analysis in court.134 What Mag-Moss offers 
128  See Barry B. Boyer, Funding Public Participation in Agency Proceedings: The Federal Trade 
Commission Experience, 70 Geo. L.J. 51, 129 (1981); see also Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don’t “Screw Joe 
the Plumber” The Sausage Making of Financial Reform, 54 Ariz. L. Rev. 55, 77, 80 (2012).
129  Financial Services and Products: The Role of the FTC in Protecting Consumers, Part II Before the S. 
Comm. on Commerce, Science, & Transp., 111th Cong. 5 (2010) (statement of Edmund Mierzwinski, 
Consumer Program Director, U.S. Public Interest Research Group) (“As many have noted, 
the FTC’s inability to swiftly enact predatory mortgage lending rules was a contributor to the 
mortgage meltdown.”).
130  See Saunders, supra note 105, at 2; supra note 107. 
131  See Harris, supra note 42, at 161; Thomas O. McGarity, The Expanded Debate over the Future of 
the Regulatory State, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1463, 1508 (1996).
132  Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Professor 
Seidenfeld, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 525, 533 (1997); see Richard J. Pierce, Rulemaking Ossification is Real: A 
Response to Testing the Ossification Thesis, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1493, 1496 (arguing that the threat 
of hard-look judicial review is the principal source of delay during the NPRM period).
133  Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Professor 
Seidenfeld, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 525, 533 (1997).
134  Id. at 535.
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are far more effective methods of regulatory obstructionism: materially 
altering a rule’s final iteration without ever having to go to court or 
maximizing the procedural pain to the point that rulemaking no longer 
remains a viable option.135 
One of the principal purposes of the modern rulemaking process 
is serving the interest of the public through reasonably balanced 
public participation.136 In trial-like proceedings, the presence of equally 
matched parties becomes even more imperative because the objective is 
to fully resolve underlying factual issues.137 In APA informal rulemaking 
proceedings, the issue of balanced participation is generally limited to 
the volume and sophistication of public comments.138 Conversely, the 
trial-like system of Mag-Moss presents obvious obstacles to achieving 
parity in participatory capacity.139 Interested parties must present 
witness and expert testimony, submit rebuttal evidence, conduct cross-
examinations, and prepare ‘post-record’ comments.140 
Presumably discerning this problem, Congress included a 
provision in the Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act of 1975 that allowed 
the FTC to subsidize impecunious parties “in trade regulation 
rulemaking proceedings who would otherwise be unable to effectively 
participate.”141 In 1980, Congress amended the provision and reduced 
the funds authorized for the program.142 Within one year, the program 
ceased to exist.143 In a comprehensive study of the program, Professor 
Barry Boyer found that the reimbursements enabled consumer groups 
to participate on more “equal footing with industry at both the hearing 
and post-hearing stages of rulemaking.”144 
Boyer’s conclusion also substantiated a 1977 comprehensive Senate 
Report on public participation in regulatory agency proceedings, which 
found that the single greatest obstacle to active public participation in 
regulatory proceedings was the lack of financial resources to meet the 
135  See, e.g., supra note 25. 
136  See Administrative Procedure Act: Legislative History, 79th Congress, 1944–46, 200–201, 
259 (1946). 
137  See S. Rep. No. 96-500, at 22 (1979) (recognizing that to effectively participate in Magnusson-
Moss rulemaking proceedings participants may need funding for all stages of the proceeding, 
like the cross-examination on disputed issues, written rebuttals, and oral submissions before the 
Commission). 
138  See Krawiec, supra note 128, at 77.
139  See supra note 137.
140  Boyer, supra note 128, at 128–29. 
141  See Cass, supra note 7, at 519.
142  Id. 
143  Id. 
144  See id; Boyer, supra note 128, at 128–29. 
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“great costs” of formal participation.145 The report went on to attribute 
the lack of public participation to the protracted nature of formal 
proceedings, which it described as having a “chilling effect.”146 Finally, 
the study discovered that citizen groups acutely felt the attendant 
burdens of procedural delays.147
While there is no recent empirical study on what adverse effects the 
repeal of this program continues to have on consumers individually 
and organizationally, mainly because there have been no Mag-Moss 
rulemakings to examine, one can reasonably conclude that the balance 
between consumer groups’ resources and the resources of companies 
on the Fortune 100 list is just as lopsided as it was three decades 
ago.148 This asymmetry therefore gives one side a decisive advantage 
in influencing the outcome of the proceeding—thereby hindering 
Congress’s intent to fully and truly disclose all disputed issues of 
material fact149—in two ways. First, qualitatively, the industries’ 
domination of the proceedings150 and capacity to continue mounting 
vigorous challenges to the proposed rule regardless of the duration 
can enfeeble the final version of the rule.151 Second, the heightened 
formality and judicial character of Mag-Moss proceedings present 
more occasions for regulated entities to delay compliance, thereby 
deterring future agency decisions.152
2. Making Some Rules More Effective Than Others
In the judicial interference context, scholars have described the 
foregoing deterrent as promoting “managerial bias.”153 That is, litigation 
creates a “managerial bias . . . toward regulating newly discovered 
hazards at the expense of long recognized, but still inadequately 
145  Staff Of S. Comm. Gov. Affairs, 95th Cong., Report On Public Participation In Regulatory 
Agency Proceedings (Comm. Print Vol. III 1977). 
146  Id. at VII. 
147  Id. 
148  Financial Services And Products: The Role of the Federal Trade Commission on Protecting Consumers, 
Part II Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Prot., Product Safety, & Ins. of the S. Comm. on Commerce, 
Science & Transp., 111th Cong. 1 n.1 (2010) (statement of Linda A. Woolley Executive Vice 
President, Government Affairs Direct Marketing Association) (noting that the Direct Marketing 
Association represents many companies on the Fortune 100 list). 
149  See H.R. Rep. No. 93-1107, at 45–46 (1993).
150  See id. at 59 (statement of Charles A. Tobin, Secretary of the Federal Trade Commission) (citing 
the “skills and inclinations of the FTC Bar,” Tobin warned that the additional procedures would 
create “fodder for the litigation mill”). 
151  See Pridgen, supra note 22, at § 16:3.
152  Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Professor 
Seidenfeld, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 525, 533 (1997).
153  Cross, supra note 32, at 1034 (accusing judicial review of introducing “systemic biases that 
impede sound regulation”). 
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regulated hazards.”154 This can also result in “legalism” controlling 
an agency’s policymaking agenda; instead of policy concerns driving 
policymaking, the agency opts for the best, i.e., easiest, legal argument, 
which may produce more anodyne regulations.155 
The drawn-out, trial-like procedures of Mag-Moss, like the threat of 
litigation and a scrutinizing judiciary, can have the same effect on the 
FTC in deciding what areas of regulation to amend or promulgate; either 
by forcing the FTC to lobby Congress for APA powers or proceeding 
under Mag-Moss.156 In turn, this decisionmaking process naturally 
favors concerns grounded in exigent circumstances, where the problem 
has become so acute that inaction is socially and politically untenable, 
as in the case of mortgage assistance,157 or areas of less consequence 
and less powerful industries, such as the regulation of commercial 
emails.158 If, however, the cost of battling industry truculence through 
Mag-Moss procedure or lobbying for temporary § 553 procedural 
power outweighs concerted consumer demand, rulemaking becomes 
infeasible.159 
For example, consumer groups have announced that the Credit 
Practices Rule requires updates to respond to changes in the credit 
industry.160 Although the FTC has had time to react in some way to 
the pressure for updates, it has no foreseeable intentions of amending 
the rule.161 In 1984, after nearly nine years, the FTC promulgated the 
Credit Practices Rule under Mag-Moss procedure.162 The rule prohibits 
confessions of judgment, exemption waivers, irrevocable wage 
assignments, non-purchase security interests in household goods, 
pyramiding late charges, and deceptive cosigner practices.163 Since its 
154  Id.
155  Id. at 1035 (arguing that it would have been unlikely for Public Citizen to focus so much 
attention on and litigate over color additives when so many more consequential health risks 
remained unregulated except for the fact that the former provided an easier legal claim). Cross 
also quotes Sunstein’s warning that “to regulate new risks in the interest of health and safety is to 
perpetuate old ones, and thus to reduce health and safety.” Id. at 1034.
156  Telephone Interview with David Vladeck, former Director of the Federal Trade Commission’s 
Bureau of Consumer Protection (Oct. 3, 2012) (admitting that the FTC prods Congress for ad hoc 
APA power, but that in itself is cumbersome).
157  Mortgage Assistance Relief Services, 75 Fed. Reg. 75,092 (Dec. 1, 2010) (to be codified at 16 
C.F.R. pt. 322) (promulgating a MARS rule pursuant to CREDIT Card Act, which was passed near 
the depths of the Great Recession, that received mostly supportive comments from industry and 
consumer groups).
158  See 15 U.S.C. § 7703 (prohibiting predatory or abusive email including fraud and obscenity). 
159  See infra notes 160–65 and accompanying text. 
160  See, e.g., Saunders, supra note 105.
161  Telephone Interview with David Vladeck, former Director of the Federal Trade Commission’s 
Bureau of Consumer Protection (Oct. 3, 2012).
162  See 49 Fed. Reg. 7740 (Mar. 1, 1984) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 444).
163  Id. 
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promulgation, the credit industry has developed new practices, which 
some consider unfair and deceptive, such as securing a loan by check 
or electronic access to a consumer’s bank account, when at the time of 
the loan, there are insufficient funds in the account to cover the check 
or promise to pay.164 While the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(CFPB) has assumed control over most FTC rules relating to financial 
products, this rule remains in the FTC’s purview, yet the FTC has no 
plans to amend it.165 
3. Opportunity Lost
‘Agile’ and ‘swift’ are characteristics not typically associated with 
bureaucracies. In certain circumstances, however, agencies can act with 
considerable agility when provided with the right procedural tools.166 
For example, the FTC promulgated the Children’s Online Privacy 
Protection Rule within a few months of Congress granting it APA 
powers.167 Such expediency, however, can be offset by the lag time it 
takes for Congress to confer this authority, thus adversely affecting the 
Commission’s purpose of crisis prevention or mitigation.168 Moreover, 
prodding Congress for a rulemaking directive is a cumbersome and 
resource-intensive process in itself.169 For example, these exact problems 
manifested during the mortgage meltdown that predated and partially 
precipitated the “Great Recession.”170 
The impending danger of the mortgage crisis was evident by 
2007.171 In the spring of 2006, several states had enacted laws that 
imposed on mortgage originators some sort of duty with respect to 
their customers.172 Although the FTC does not have the authority 
164  See, e.g., Saunders, supra note 105, at 7–10.
165  See, e.g., Saunders, supra note 105; supra note 107.
166  See supra note 26 and accompanying text; see also Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 4580 
(Jan. 29, 2003) (16 C.F.R. pt. 310).
167  See supra note 26. 
168  Interview by John Villafranco with David Vladeck, former Director of Consumer Protection, 
Federal Trade Commission, (April 2010), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/publishing/antitrust_source/Apr10_VladeckIntrvw4_14f.authcheckdam.pdf.
169  Telephone Interview with David Vladeck, former Director of the Federal Trade Commission’s 
Bureau of Consumer Protection (Oct. 3, 2012).
170  See Consumer Credit and Debt: The Role of the Federal Trade Commission in Protecting the Public 
Before Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, & Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 
111th Cong. 22–23 (2009) (statement of The Federal Trade Commission); Financial Services and 
Products: The Role of the FTC in Protecting Consumers, Part II Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, 
Science, & Transp., 111th Cong. 5 (2010) (statement of Edmund Mierzwinski, Consumer Program 
Director, U.S. Public Interest Research Group) (“As many have noted, the FTC’s inability to swiftly 
enact predatory mortgage lending rules was a contributor to the mortgage meltdown.”).
171  See H.R. 2309: The Consumer Credit and Debt Protection Act Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, 
Trade, & Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. 3 (2009) (statement 
of Kathleen E. Keest on behalf of National Consumer Law Center). 
172  Id. at 7. 
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to regulate banks, it could have issued rules regulating non-bank 
entities offering loan-modifications.173 Moreover, under the Unfair and 
Deceptive Practices Act (UDAP), if the FTC had promulgated a UDAP 
rule regulating consumer credit, the Federal Reserve, which regulates 
banks, would have been required to pass “me too” rules.174
Because the FTC, practically speaking, cannot initiate rulemaking 
without congressional approval, it had to wait for authorization until 
May 2009, when the President signed the Credit Card Act requiring 
the FTC to issue rules regulating unfair or deceptive practices in the 
mortgage arena pursuant to § 553 notice-and-comment procedure.175 
The FTC issued its first rule in November 2010, which proscribes the 
collection of money from a homeowner unless the homeowner agrees 
to allow the loan-modifier to send a written offer to the mortgage 
originator.176 It also requires clear-and-conspicuous disclosure of 
salient information.177 
In an interview with the American Bar Association in April 2010, 
the then-Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection, David 
Vladeck, lamented the lack of general APA rulemaking authority.178 He 
characterized the fact that the FTC could have completed mortgage 
service rules much sooner, if it had § 553 rulemaking authority, as a 
“serious opportunity lost.”179 In short, earlier promulgation of the 
above rule could have spared many consumers thousands of dollars 
lost in homeowner scams.180 
C. Delivering the Message? Guidelines and Enforcement 
for Green Marketing, Food Advertising, and More
The FTC’s use of guides reflects the theory that a non-binding 
guideline, or a policy statement, satisfies the basic functions of 
rulemaking without having to adhere to rulemaking procedural 
requirements: (1) it can set policy prospectively, (2) put industries on 
173  Id. at 9.
174  Id. 
175  Mortgage Assistance Relief Services, 75 Fed. Reg. 75,092 (Dec. 1, 2010) (to be codified at 16 
CFR pt. 322).
176  Id. 
177  Id. 
178  Interview by John Villafranco with David Vladeck, former Director of Consumer Protection, 
Federal Trade Commission, (April 2010), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/publishing/antitrust_source/Apr10_VladeckIntrvw4_14f.authcheckdam.pdf.
179  Id.; see also The Consumer Credit and Debt Protection Act Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade 
& Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. 3 (2009) (statement of 
Kathleen E. Keest on behalf of National Consumer Law Center).
180  Interview by John Villafranco with David Vladeck, former Director of Consumer Protection, 
Federal Trade Commission, (April 2010).
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notice that enforcement actions will hew to the interpretations within 
the guidelines, and (3) serve as a deterrent.181 
However, it was the very inability of guides to perform these 
functions adequately that led the FTC to pursue substantive 
rulemaking.182 Moreover, the FTC originally turned to guides in the 
period before substantive rulemaking emerged because cease-and-
desist orders were onerous and wasteful of limited resources “where 
the unlawful practices were widespread throughout a particular 
industry.”183
Now, the FTC has come full circle. Because guidelines do not 
inherently have the force of law, the FTC must issue cease-and-
desist orders and allege violation of the statute on which the guide 
was based, rather than on violation of the guide itself.184 Further, the 
reliance on “self-regulation” casts larger penumbras where certain 
regulated entities feel more comfortable operating “close to the edge” 
of questionable advertising practices.185 Therefore, the absence of the 
force of law as a sufficient deterrent and basis for automatic liability 
can hamper the adjudicatory process by increasing the need for more 
enforcement actions which will either be more limited in effect, or 
pioneering in a way that develops new Commission policy without 
input from market actors and without optimal clarity.186 
The FTC published the Green Guides in 1992 to provide advertisers 
with a basis for voluntary compliance by offering them “safe harbors” 
in the form of examples and potentially qualifying claims.187 The use 
of deceptive green-marketing claims shows little sign of abating, 
however.188 In 2007, an environmental marketing firm conducted a 
study of 1,753 claims on 1,018 products, and “tested the claims against 
181  See Gibson, supra note 33; Cass, supra note 7, at 387; Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on 
“Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 Duke L.J. 1385, 1441 (1992). For more on the nature of 
guidance documents, see generally Jeffrey S. Lubbers, A Federal Guide to Agency Rulemaking 
63–93 (5th ed. 2012). 
182  See Earl W. Kinter & Christopher Smith, The Emergence of the Federal Trade Commission as a 
Formidable Consumer Protection Agency, 26 Mercer L. Rev. 651, 673 (1975).
183  Id. 
184  Id.; Harris, supra note 42, at 313 (noting that it is still necessary “for the FTC to follow a case–
by–case approach, determining that individual environmental advertisements were deceptive”); 
see generally Pac. Gas & Electric Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 506 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (“a 
[guideline] . . . does not establish a “binding norm.” It is not finally determinative of the issues or 
rights to which its addressed . . . When the agency applies the policy in a particular situation, it 
must be prepared to support the policy just as if the [guideline] had never been issued.”).
185  See Gibson, supra note 33, at 434; Lubbers, supra note 181, at 70. 
186  See Gibson, supra note 33, at 434; infra notes 211–13.
187  Pridgen, supra note 22, at § 11:43.
188  Gibson, supra note 33, at 424–25.
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the best available practices in environmental marketing.”189 The study 
found that all but one of the products committed a false or misleading 
claim.190 
While the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection, under the 
leadership of former Director David Vladeck, has deservedly earned 
praise for its campaign against deceptive advertising, guidelines 
and adjudications remain highly imperfect vehicles for effectuating 
regulatory objectives.191 That guidelines are largely designed to condition 
voluntary compliance provides more disengaged administrations with a 
convenient pretext for regulatory abdication.192 Further, it is incredible 
to believe that non-comprehensive and non-binding policy statements 
will succeed in widely deterring companies from doing something 
against their short-term interests.193 The use of green-marketing 
claims is very effective in influencing consumers.194 Given the relative 
challenges of prosecuting companies that are not automatically liable 
under the guides and the profitability of sophisticated yet misleading 
green-marketing, the FTC does not have the resources to do anything 
but adopt a case-by-case approach that may only target the most 
egregious violators operating on the margins of the market,195 or risk a 
“profitable and lengthy game of postponing the effect of the rule on [a 
company’s] current practice.”196 
Similarly, the FTC’s Enforcement Policy Statement on Food 
189  Id. 
190  Id. at 425. In 2012, the FTC finalized updates to the Green Guides which provided guidance 
on “carbon-offset” and “free-of” claims, but declined to provide guidance on “organic, natural, 
or sustainable” claims. See Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 77 Fed. Reg. 
62,122 (Oct. 11, 2012) (codifed at 16 C.F.R. pt. 260). 
191  See, e.g., Jeff Gelles, Consumer Chief Leaves FTC a Feistier Place, The Phil. Inquirer, Dec. 3, 2012, 
http://articles.philly.com/2012-12-03/news/35550208_1_ftc-s-bureau-jon-leibowitz-small-ball.
192  Pridgen, supra note 22, at § 11:45 (noting that from 2000 to 2009, the FTC took a “hiatus” from 
enforcement actions against deceptive green-marketing). 
193  See Greg Northern, Greenwashing the Organic Label: Abusive Green-Marketing in an Increasingly 
Eco-Friendly Marketplace, 7 J. Food. L. & Pol’y 101, 119 (2011) (remarking that due to the omissions 
of “organic” and “sustainable” claims under the 2012 updates to the Guides, “many claims will 
remain unguided, and marketers remain free to aggressively market their products without clear 
boundaries in which they must remain”).
194  See Gibson, supra note 33, at 424–25.
195  See Thomas C. Downs, “Environmentally Friendly Advertising:” Its Future Requires a New 
Regulatory Authority, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 155, 179, 185 (1992) (arguing that, even after publication 
of the 1992 Guides, the FTC was not adequately equipped to combat the burgeoning market 
of green-advertising); David C. Vladeck, ABI Winter Leadership Development Conference 8 
(Dec. 10, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/
abi-winter-leadership-development-conference/101210vladeckabi.pdf (telling the Conference 
that the FTC recently brought seven suits against companies claiming their bamboo textiles are 
environmentally friendly, when most, if not all, bamboo textile products are made from Rayon, 
which is made from an environmentally unfriendly process). 
196  Nat’l Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 
951 (1974) (explaining that this risk is minimized by the use of substantive rules). 
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Advertising has not been immune to the ineluctable flaws of 
guidelines, namely, a deterrence deficit and amorphous boundaries.197 
The FTC issued its food advertising guidelines in May 1994, permitting 
considerable flexibility for advertisers.198 The policy statement indicates 
what sorts of acts or practices may constitute deceptive advertising and 
what advertisers should not do, such as fail to disclose nutrients, or 
make health claims unsubstantiated by competent and reliable scientific 
evidence.199 The statement’s guidance is also heavily conditioned, 
written with enough ambiguity to allow for yawning prosecutorial 
discretion.200 
Unsurprisingly, in the realm of children’s advertisements, the 
guides’ efficacy has been questionable.201 In the past nine years, the 
Institute of Medicine, Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, American 
Academy of Pediatrics, and the American Psychological Association 
found that many experts “have linked dramatic increase in the 
prevalence of childhood obesity to the emergence of advertising of 
unhealthy foods to children.”202 A recent study by the Center for Science 
in the Public Interest found that a majority of all food and beverage 
manufacturers do not have policies on marketing food to children, or 
their policies have loopholes that allow for such advertising.203 The 
study surveyed 128 food and entertainment companies and restaurant 
chains, giving seventy-five percent of these companies an “F” grade 
for their food marketing policies.204 The FTC’s annual snapshot of 
enforcement activities in the last two years also indicates that deceptive 
advertisements are not merely the province of peripheral companies, 
197  Katy Bachman, Putting Brands in Their Place: FTC’s David Vladeck leads the charge in the feds’ 
crackdown on deceptive advertising, Adweek (Nov. 13, 2012, 12:12 AM), http://www.adweek.com/
news/advertising-branding/putting-brands-their-place-145058?page=1 (commenting that, until 
recently, the FTC’s guideline was “vague and flexible,” resulting in mixed outcomes for the FTC 
and settlements that failed to adequately clarify the guideline).
198  Harris, supra note 42, at 323.
199  See Enforcement Policy Statement on Food Advertising, Fed. Trade Comm’n (May 1994), http://
www.ftc.gov/enforcement-policy-statement-on-food-advertising. 
200  Id. (“The Commission recognizes that there may be certain limited instances in which carefully 
qualified health claims may be permitted under Section 5 although not yet authorized by the FDA, 
if the claims are expressly qualified to convey clearly and fully the extent of the scientific support. 
At the same time, however, the Commission believes that qualified claims based on evidence that 
is inconsistent with the larger body of evidence have the potential to mislead consumers, and, 
therefore, are likely to violate Section 5.”).
201  See Michelle M. Mello, Federal Trade Commission Regulation of Food Advertising to Children: 
Possibilities for a Reinvigorated Role, 35 J. Health Pol. Pol’y & L. 227, 239 (2010); Roseann B. Termini 
et al., Food Advertising and Childhood Obesity: A Call to Action for Proactive Solutions, 12 Minn. J.L. 
Sci. & Tech. 619, 643 (2011); Jennifer L. Pomeranz, Extending the Fantasy in the Supermarket: Where 
Unhealthy Food Promotions Meet Children and How the Government can Intervene, 9 Ind. Health L. 
Rev. 117 (2012). 
202  See Mello, supra note 201, at 231.
203  Termini, supra note 201, at 643–44.
204  Id. at 644. 
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but, rather, that major companies are flouting industry guidelines.205 
Nevertheless, the defining element of guidelines has typically been 
the promotion of self-regulation.206 The corresponding diminution in 
the deterrent or incentive factor renders the remedy incommensurate 
with the problem it seeks to address.207 Instead of conducting binary 
examinations where the FTC can see whether a company is complying 
with a rule, the FTC must proceed circuitously to determine whether 
and prove how a company’s advertising claim is deceptive.208 More 
importantly, the remedies obtained by the FTC through enforcement 
actions against food advertisers and others are often consent orders 
proscribing factually unique, highly-particularized claims that until 
recently have provided little or no precedent to regulate industry-wide 
deception.209 
205  The FTC In 2011: Federal Trade Commission Annual Report 37–40 (April 2011), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports_annual/annual-report-
2011/2011chairmansreport_0.pdf (detailing the FTC’s actions against Nestle, Kellogg, POM 
Wonderful, and Dannon); cf. Lydia Depillis, The Government Will Never Win its War on Bogus 
Diet Products, Wash. Post. WonkBlog (Jan. 7, 2014 4:14PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/01/07/in-the-fight-between-government-and-bogus-diet-products-
the-government-will-always-lose/ (suggesting that the FTC’s most recent enforcement against 
purveyors of diet products, involving a use of updated guidelines and adjudications, is, like 
prior FTC attempts at regulating Internet marketers, somewhat like “playing whack-a-mole,” and 
stating as fact that weight-loss companies “seem not to be dissuaded by some of them getting 
busted in awhile”).
206  See Mello, supra note 201, at 238 (discussing the use of guidelines in conjunction with the 
FTC’s traditional preference for industry self-regulation); Enforcement Policy Statement on Food 
Advertising, Fed. Trade Comm’n (May 1994), http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement-policy-statement-
on-food-advertising (using precatory phrases like “advertisers should” thirteen times). 
207  See Mello, supra note 201, at 238 (revealing that the American Psychological Association has 
also countenanced the belief that categorical restrictions on certain claims, rather than disclosures, 
would be a more effective remedy because studies make clear that young children do not 
comprehend the intended meaning of the most widely used disclaimers.)
208  See supra notes 183–84 and accompanying text. 
209  See Enforcement Policy Statement on Food Advertising n.13, Fed. Trade Comm’n (May 1994), 
http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement-policy-statement-on-food-advertising (May 1994), http://www.
ftc.gov/enforcement-policy-statement-on-food-advertising (claiming that companies can glean 
some sort of coherent precedent from twenty-one somewhat disparate cases and consent orders 
involving everything from an indeterminate insufficiency of scientific evidence in different 
contexts; permissible representations based on approved labeling pursuant to FDA regulations; 
claims of milk found to be inappropriate because, in an unidentified context, they contained 
implied claims about calcium content; a requirement that claims involving health or safety 
issues require a “relatively high level of substantiation;” a requirement to disclose conflicting 
medically expert beliefs in a claim about dietary cholesterol and heart disease; and articulation 
of a general principle that claims should not be provided in a manner that overstate a particular 
benefit or product); see also In the matter of Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23, 91–93 (1972) (setting forth the 
substantiation factors, which seem tantamount to a “totality of the circumstances” test, previously 
relied on by the Commission in assessing advertising claims); The FTC in 2011, supra note 205, at 37 
(acknowledging, albeit by implication, that past consent orders failed to provide desirable clarity 
to companies); Katy Bachman, Putting Brands in Their Place: FTC’s David Vladeck leads the charge in 
the feds’ crackdown on deceptive advertising, Adweek (Nov. 13, 2012, 12:12 AM), http://www.adweek.
com/news/advertising-branding/putting-brands-their-place-145058?page=1 (noting that for years 
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This, however, has notably changed with two recent groundbreaking 
settlements against Nestle and Iovate. The settlements established 
a new policy that defines the previously malleable and ambiguous 
standard for assessing food-marketing claims—whether those claims 
are supported by ‘competent and reliable scientific evidence’”—as 
requiring two clinical trials and FDA pre-approval.210 While this 
development evidences that, under the right leadership, rulemaking 
is not always necessary to set policies that provide effective consumer 
protections, it nevertheless exposes the shortcomings of policymaking 
by adjudication. For instance, the marketing industry was blindsided; 
it neither had the opportunity to comment on, nor have notice of, the 
new standard.211 Moreover, the two clinical trials and FDA pre-approval 
requirement does not necessarily extend to the entire industry, to every 
case, or even to every company product.212 Such indeterminacy leaves 
individual companies wondering what level of substantiation the 
Commission will apply to their products. A question that may not be 
answered until a company is defending itself in litigation.213
the FTC’s standards for food-marketing claims were “vague and flexible” resulting in inefficient 
litigation). 
210  The FTC in 2011, supra note 205, at 40–41; Bachman, supra note 209.
211  Bachman, supra note 209 (quoting industry attorney, Marc Roth: “[the new policy] shook us 
as an industry . . . [it’s] a game changer”). The advertising industry has also been reeling from 
the FTC’s new policy of seeking restitution, a remedy previously reserved for extreme cases or 
those involving fraud, in more garden-variety deceptive-advertising cases. Id. (discussing a $25 
million settlement—that had “marketer’s heads spinning”—with Reebok over claims that its 
shoes promised “better legs and a better butt with every step”).
212  For instance, in the Commission’s consent order with Reebok, the order provides two different 
definitions of scientific substantiation. Reebok is prohibited from claiming that its shoes, EasyTones, 
are effective in strengthening muscles unless the claim is supported by “one adequate and well-
controlled human clinical study evaluated in light of all other available scientific evidence.” 
For any other muscle tone claims related to EasyTones, however, Reebok has to provide “tests, 
analyses, research, or studies that have been conducted and evaluated in an objective manner 
by qualified persons and are generally accepted in the profession to yield accurate and reliable 
results.” See Heather M. Mandelkehr, When Toning Shoes Strengthen Nothing More Than Likelihood of 
Lawsuit: Why the Federal Trade Commission needs Guidelines Regarding Proper Substantiation of Fitness 
Advertisements, 20 Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports L.J. 297, 329–30 (2013). Notwithstanding the vestigial 
uncertainty, it appears the food advertising industry is treating these adjudications as establishing 
industry-wide rules. See infra n.213.
213  See In the Matter of POM Wonderful LLC, No. 9344, 2013 WL 268926, at *65 n.37 (F.T.C. Jan. 6, 
2013) (requiring two clinical trials, but not FDA pre-approval and warning that “our ruling today 
does not foreclose that we may again conclude, in an appropriate case, that FDA pre-approval 
would be an appropriate remedy.”); FTC v. Springtech 77376, LLC, et al., 2013 WL 3783645 (July 
16, 2013) (citing footnote 37 in Pom Wonderful and requiring that Springfield obtain FDA pre-
approval to substantiate claims concerning its lice-treatment product); infra note 270. In the matter 
of POM Wonderful LLC was recently argued before the D.C. Circuit, with oral argument scheduled 
for May 2, 2014. POM and its supporting amici curiae unsurprisingly accused the FTC, among 
other things, of contravening Mag-Moss and the APA by unilaterally crafting and establishing an 
“industry-wide” rule through adjudication. See Brief for Natural-Health U.S.A.& Techfreedom as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, POM Wonderful LLC v. FTC, No. 13-1060, 2013 WL 4477444 
at *23 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 21, 2013). In its brief, the FTC countered by arguing that its two-clinical-trial 
substantiation requirement for medical benefit claims in food advertising conforms to decades-
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III. The FTC “on Steroids”
Perhaps viewing the early enforcement actions of the FTC under 
the Obama Administration as harbingers of a more invigorated 
Commission, former FTC Chairman Jim Miller, a Reagan appointee, has 
argued that allowing the FTC to operate under § 553 APA rulemaking 
procedures would be akin to “putting the FTC on steroids.”214 This oft-
repeated warning, however, fails to appreciate or deliberately ignores 
the robust rulemaking fetters foisted by all corners of the federal 
government that challenge the veracity of such a claim and obviate the 
need for Mag-Moss. 
A. Additional Congressional Controls
The Constitution and the realities of modern-day politics provide 
Congress with a versatile toolbox to rein in overzealous agencies.215 
First, the appropriations process gives Congress the “power of the 
purse.”216 The FTC must justify its budget based on its annual report 
and performance plans.217 This is no mere formality. Congress has 
already exercised its appropriations power over the FTC.218 Following 
the hearings and investigations surrounding the proposal to regulate 
children’s advertising, the FTC was officially allowed to go “out of 
business” when Congress did not renew funds for its operation in 1980219 
and gave the FTC two days to close down operations. Although funds 
were ultimately appropriated, the FTC received the message—over 
the next year and a half, the FTC aborted nearly all of its controversial 
rulemaking investigations.220 Second, Congress can prevent a rule from 
taking effect. Pursuant to the Congressional Review Act, Congress 
reviews all “major” final agency rules and is empowered with a fast-
track process to pass a joint resolution that would bar the regulation 
from taking effect.221 
old precedent. See Brief of Respondent, Federal Trade Commission, POM Wonderful LLC v. FTC, 
No. 13-1060, 2013 WL 507440 at *8–9 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 7, 2014) (citing its 2001 Dietary Supplement 
Guide and Thompson Med. Co. v. FTC, 791 F.2d 189, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). Although defending 
the authority to make policy through adjudications, the FTC denied that is what has occurred. See 
id. at *56 n.24, *83–85.
214  See Brody Mullins and John D. McKinnon, FTC’s Powers Would Grow Under Financial Overhaul, 
Wall St. J., October 29, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125677809189114853.html.
215  Cass, supra note 7, at 60.
216  U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 
217  See FTC Submits Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Request and Performance Plans to Congress, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n (Feb. 13, 2012), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/02/budget.shtm. 
218  See Weingast & Moran, supra note 71, at 775.
219  Id.
220  Id. 
221  5 U.S.C. §§ 801(b)(1), 802 (2012). Although only successfully used once in its history, some 
senators have recently invoked the Act’s powers to try an overturn various EPA rules, nearly 
succeeding in doing so. Thomas McGarity, Administrative Law as Blood Sport: Policy Erosion in a 
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Congress also has less overt means of combating controversial rules. 
Courts have not yet found congressional communication in informal 
rulemaking to be improper.222 If a challenging party wanted to overturn 
a rule based on such ex parte contacts, it would have to demonstrate 
that the agency’s decision was based upon factors introduced by 
the ex parte communications irrelevant to the agency’s decision 
under the applicable statute.223 Therefore, blatant threats to withhold 
appropriations would constitute extraneous factors, but this still leaves 
room for more discreet indications of congressional disapproval.224 
Finally, although the APA permits ex parte communications between 
the decisionmaker and agency personnel, Mag-Moss does not.225 
Consequently, members of Congress can discuss rulemaking with FTC 
personnel and decisionmakers during the process in the presence of no 
one, but the FTC staff and FTC decisionmakers may not do the same.
B. Executive Control
The Executive can dramatically alter the outcome of the rulemaking 
process by setting regulatory goals and subjecting agency rules to 
stringent cost-benefit analysis.226 Specifically, executive agencies must 
quantitatively justify “significant” rules by submitting cost-benefit 
analyses to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) 
within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB),227 widely 
considered to be the most powerful agency that few have ever heard of.228 
In fact, many scholars and pro-regulatory groups have generally come 
to view OIRA as a “one-way ratchet” that primarily functions to dilute 
or derail proposed agency rules.229 While the FTC is an independent 
Highly Partisan Age, 61 Duke L.J. 1671, 1717 (2012).
222  Weingast & Moran, supra note 71 at 314.
223  Id. at 315.
224  Id. at 315 n.61.
225  See 12 U.S.C. § 57a (2012). 
226  See infra note 227. 
227  Cass, supra note 7, at 532; see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 
47 Admin. L. Rev. 59, 69 (1995) (noting that the OIRA “reviews all agency statements of basis 
and purpose in major rulemakings to insure that the agency has addressed each of the myriad 
considerations adequately before the agency issues its final rule”). 
228  Note, OIRA Avoidance, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 994, 994 (2011) (citing Martha Minow’s, Dean of 
Harvard Law School, introduction of Cass Sunstein in 2010). 
229  See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Overview of the Regulatory State, 
106 Colum. L. Rev. 1260, 1268 (2006) (noting that “OIRA stands as a structural roadblock on the 
path of regulation, but not deregulation—an asymmetry which cannot be justified on cost-benefit 
grounds . . .” and “OIRA generally does not review agency inaction. Agency inertia is therefore 
privileged under the current system of OIRA review”); Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: 
Avoiding Agency Capture through Institutional Design, 89 Tex. L. Rev. 15, 31–36 (2010) (arguing 
that OIRA likely adds to the problem of agency capture); Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. 
Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 
105 Mich. L. Rev. 47, 74 (2006) (finding, based on an empirical review of the Bush I and Clinton 
administrations, that OIRA, when reviewing EPA rulemaking, almost exclusively focused on 
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agency and thus not subject to OIRA review that applies rigid cost-
benefit analysis, this could easily be changed through executive order.
The President can also temper “activist” rulemaking through 
executive orders that set the administration’s regulatory priorities.230 For 
example, President Obama’s Executive Order 13,563 requires agencies 
to develop ways to review and eliminate unnecessary regulation, 
expressing concern for economic growth and innovation, terms often 
used by regulated industries to caution against regulation.231 Further, 
the head of the OMB during President Obama’s first term, Professor 
Cass Sunstein, has written extensively on the need for thorough 
deliberation in rulemaking, checked by a probing judiciary.232
Finally, under the Regulatory Flexibility Act, agencies must 
consider, among other things, the potential impact of regulations on 
small businesses and other small entities and provide any significant 
alternatives to the proposed rule.233 These considerations are compiled 
into a formal analysis that is submitted to the Chief Counsel for 
Advocacy of the Small Business Administration (SBA) before 
rulemaking proceedings begin.234 The Act, as amended by the Small 
Business Regulatory Fairness Act of 1996,235 also expressly authorizes 
judicial review for any small entity adversely affected by final agency 
action.236 For some agencies, including the CFPB, the Act further 
requires consideration of comments and suggestions from interested 
individuals representing small entities, determined by the SBA, on 
the proposed rule, and the convening of regulatory review panels that 
review all pertinent materials and collect advice and recommendations 
that become part of the rulemaking record.237 Despite its mandate to 
protect small businesses, the SBA’s Office of Advocacy has elicited 
accusations, based on detailed studies, that it sometimes serves as a 
the cost side of cost-benefit analysis and “routinely sought to reduce regulatory burdens” by, in 
part, disproportionately focusing on short-term costs and benefits); Rena Steinzor, et al., Ctr. 
for Progressive Reform, White Paper #1111, Behind Closed Doors at the White House: How 
Politics Trumps Protection of Public Health, Worker Safety, and the Environment 4, 8, 9 
(November 2011), available at http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/OIRA_Meetings_1111.
pdf (characterizing OIRA as a “court of last resort” for industry lobbyists, and finding that, based 
on a ten year empirical study, the number of people representing regulated industries at OIRA 
meetings was five times the number of people representing public-interest groups, and that OIRA 
has changed seventy-six percent of the rules submitted to it under President Obama). 
230  Cass, supra note 7, at 532.
231  Id. at 535. 
232  Martin Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 Va. L. Rev. 447, 468 (1986). 
233  See 5 U.S.C. § 603 (2012). 
234  Id. 
235  Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 857 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 
and 28 U.S.C.). 
236  5 U.S.C. § 611.
237  Id. § 609(b), (d)(2). 
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proxy agency for the interests of large corporations.238 
C. “Hard Look”
The “hard look” doctrine is a notable counter to the proposition 
that the recoupling of APA procedure with the FTC would dangerously 
amplify the Commission’s power.239 The doctrine—that courts must 
take a “hard look” at the administrative record and the agency’s 
explanatory material, criteria, relevant factors, regulatory options, and 
support of material empirical propositions—has spawned an entire 
body of scholarship devoted to its ossifying effect.240 
Its proponents champion it for endeavoring to achieve the same 
outcome that Mag-Moss supporters espouse, namely the promotion 
of careful deliberation.241 Its detractors, such as Professor Thomas 
McGarity, critique it for causing judicial overreach and agency 
stagnation; agencies, constantly fearful of future challenges, are either 
less inclined to initiate rulemakings or amend rules, or the process 
slows because the agency is concerned about making an extensive 
record to defend in court.242 In short, the continued vitality of hard-
238  Randy Rabinowitz et al., Ctr. for Effective Gov’t, Small Business, Public Health, and 
Scientific Integrity: Whose Interests does the Office of Advocacy at the Small Business 
Administration Serve? 1 (2013) (finding that the Office’s comments against regulating, among 
other things, formaldehyde, did not raise any issues concerning small businesses, instead, it 
parroted talking points provided by trade associations representing major chemical companies 
opposing the proposed regulation); Sidney Shapiro & James Goodwin, Ctr. for Progressive 
Reform, White Paper #1302, Distorting the Interests of Small Business: How the Small Business 
Administration Office of Advocacy’s Politicization of Small Business Concerns Undermines 
Public Health and Safety (2013) (finding, among other things, that the Office “sponsors anti-
regulatory research designed to bolster attacks on the U.S. regulatory system”—including a much-
discredited study that purported to calculate the annual cost of federal regulations in 2008 to be 
$1.75 trillion—and “pushes for rule changes that would benefit large firms instead of narrowly 
tailoring its recommendations so that they help only truly small businesses”); see generally Robb 
Mandelbaum, A Small Business Office is Accused of Advocating for Big Business, NY Times Blog, 
March 18, 2013, 11:00 AM, http://boss.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/18/a-small-business-office-is-
accused-of-advocating-for-big-business/?_r=0.
239  Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Professor 
Seidenfeld, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 525 (1997); see Thomas O. McGarity, Administrative Law as Blood Sport: 
Policy Erosion in a Highly Partisan Age, 61 Duke L.J. 1671, 1693–95 (2012) (documenting the fight 
surrounding the Durbin Amendment to highlight how outside groups and regulated industries 
can and will spend millions of dollars to influence agency decisionmaking through lobbying, 
public-relations campaigns, and attack advertising).
240  See, e.g., Cross, supra note 32; Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the 
Rulemaking Process, 41 Duke L.J. 1385, 1412 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Unintended Effects of 
Judicial Review of Agency Rules: How Federal Courts Have Contributed to the Electricity Crisis of the 
1990s, 43 Admin. L. Rev. 7 (1991).
241  See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1511, 1570 (1992) (arguing that civic republicanism merits the use and expansion of a “hard 
look” approach to judicial review).
242  See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 Duke L.J. 
1385, 1412 (1992); see also Cross, supra note 32, at 1019. 
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look judicial review should allay fears of omnipotent agencies riding 
roughshod over regulated industries.243
D. “The APA is Not Radical”
Speaking before the Senate Subcommittee on Consumer Protection 
in 2010, FTC Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch declared that “APA 
rulemaking is not radical.”244 He followed that understatement 
by noting that the Securities and Exchange Commission has APA 
rulemaking powers, as do most other agencies.245 Indeed, the APA has 
remained the central pillar of administrative procedure without any 
significant amendments for almost seventy years.246 That Congress did 
not create the APA to augment administrative power, but to restrain it, 
also militates against viewing § 553’s provisions as vesting an agency 
with some extraordinarily aggrandizing power. 247
Finally, scholarly proponents of the ossification thesis have not 
only attributed the obstruction of quality rulemaking to “hybrid” 
statutes and judicial review, but also to the APA itself.248 The lacuna 
that is the APA’s pre-proposal period provides opportunities for 
regulated entities to exert undue pressure on agencies.249 A recent 
study on the agencies operationalizing the “Volcker Rule”250 concluded 
243  See, e.g., Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148–49 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (striking down an 
SEC rule that provided a modest change to shareholder voting as arbitrary and capricious, finding 
that the rule “failed adequately to quantify the certain costs or to explain why those costs could 
not be quantified; neglected to supports its predictive judgments; contradicted itself; and failed to 
respond to substantial problems raised by commenters”); Leen Al-Alami, Business Roundtable v. 
SEC: Rising Judicial Mistrust and the Onset of a New Era in Judicial Review of Securities Regulation, 15 
U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 541, 559 (2013) (arguing that Business Roundtable expanded the scope of arbitrary-
and-capricious review and “raise[d] serious questions about how . . . any agency can succeed at a 
cost-benefit showing”); The FTC’s Enforcement Tools against Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices in 
Financial Products & Services and Other Sectors Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Prot., Prod. Safety, & 
Ins. of the S. Comm. On Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 111th Cong. 9 (2010) (statement of Dee Pridgen). 
244  Financial Services and Products: The Role of the FTC in Protecting Consumers, Before the Subcomm. 
on Consumer Prot., Prod. Safety, & Ins. of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp. 111th Cong. 1 
(2010) (statement of J. Thomas Rosch, Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission).
245  Id.
246  Alan B. Morrison, The Administrative Procedure Act: A Living and Responsive Law, 72 Va. L. Rev. 
253, 254 (1986).
247  Id. at 260–61; William Funk, Bargaining, 46 Duke L.J. 1351, 1379 (1997) “[the APA] is designed 
to constrain the discretion of agencies through procedural regularity and judicial oversight.”).
248  Krawiec, supra note 128, at 55, 56.
249  Id. at 59. 
250  Created by the Dodd-Frank Act and named after the former Federal Reserve Chairman, Paul 
Volcker, the eponymous rule, in essence, prohibits banks from engaging in proprietary trading, 
i.e., trading using the bank’s own funds, and from entering into certain relationships with hedge or 
private equity funds, subject to exceptions, of course. See 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012). For more on how 
capacious some of those exceptions are, see Alan Sloan, The Volcker Rule: A Triumph of Complexity 
Over Common Sense, Wash. Post., Dec. 19, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
economy/the-volcker-rule-a-triumph-of-complexityover-common-sense/2013/12/19/92b09ed6-
68ef-11e3-8b5b-a77187b716a3_story.html.
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that, “the pre-proposal phase is a battleground for agenda setting, and 
that battleground is dominated by regulated industry.”251 The paper 
also analyzed comments submitted during the notice-and-comment 
process.252 Although individual citizens supportive of the rule 
constituted the overwhelming majority of total comments, most were 
duplicative (standard form), or lacked the sophistication and substance 
of industry comments.253 The author noted that this validated prior 
research that questioned the efficiency and utility of the notice-and-
comment process.254
Nevertheless, despite these questions, the APA is remarkable for 
the procedural protections it does afford through notice-and-comment 
and judicial review of rulemaking, which in design and in practice 
strengthen democratic legitimacy, especially when compared to the 
administrative law of other advanced western democracies.255 
IV. What Is To Be Done?
Although the Mag-Moss “albatross”256 does not pose an existential 
threat to the FTC, it has circumscribed the Commission by effectively 
depriving it of an integral means to fulfill its mandate.257 Since the FTC’s 
desired recourse—permanent restoration of § 553 APA rulemaking 
authority—failed in the Senate by one vote in 2010,258 the question 
remains: what is to be done? 
A. Status Quo
The easiest option is for the FTC to continue adapting to its lack of 
general informal rulemaking authority by triaging with adjudications, 
guidelines, and requests to Congress for discrete, temporary § 553 
rulemaking power.259 This allows the FTC to conserve political capital, 
251  Krawiec, supra note 128, at 84.
252  Id. at 54.
253  Id. at 58.
254  Id. at 84.
255  See generally Eduardo Jordao & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Judicial Review of Executive Policymaking 
in Advanced Democracies: Beyond Rights Review, 66 Admin. L. Rev. (forthcoming March, 2014) 
(comparing rulemaking procedures and judicial review in the United States, France, Canada, 
and Italy, and finding that in France, Canada, and Italy there is limited and in some cases no 
judicial review of rulemaking and generally no broad legally enforceable provisions for public 
participation or agencies contemporaneously providing reasons for their actions). 
256  H.R. 2309: The Consumer Credit and Debt Protection Act Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade & 
Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 111th Cong. 9 (2009) (statement of Kathleen 
E. Keest on behalf of National Consumer Law Center) (coining the phrase, “Mag-Moss albatross”). 
257  Telephone Interview with David Vladeck, former Director of the Federal Trade Commission’s 
Bureau of Consumer Protection (Oct. 3, 2012).
258  Id.
259  Id. (suggesting the FTC lacks the “appetite” to make another “run” on Congress in the same 
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by not lobbying Congress again for the repeal of Mag-Moss, for more 
targeted requests like the MARS rule. Moreover, policymaking through 
adjudication is much more diffuse and less public.260 When acting 
through adjudication, an agency is generally more “impregnable to 
political attack,” as opposed to rulemaking where it might often have to 
endure a public and protracted process before it takes any substantive 
action.261 Guidelines may also be able to shore up some deficiencies 
by inducing compliance as more and more enforcement actions are 
brought against non-compliant companies.262 
The current nostrums, however, are in many ways more inefficient 
and unfair to both consumers and regulated industries. First, it was 
the time, expense, and relative inequity of adjudicatory measures that 
prompted the rise of informal rulemaking.263 In the words of the former 
Director for the Bureau of Consumer Protection: “[rules] give you a 
better bang for your buck.”264 Bereft of the force of law, guidelines are 
simply less likely to induce compliance than rules, thereby increasingly 
hinging the former’s success on the scope, nature, and volume of 
enforcements, which (1) should trouble regulated industries because 
the guidelines provide the Commission with considerable latitude 
in the targets of its actions and the content of its consent orders, and 
(2) may require high-profile resource-intensive actions that strive to 
effect greater deterrence.265 Second, because rulemaking is a response 
to “serious defects in the marketplace,” a reliance on guides and 
adjudications lacks the requisite breadth and immediacy to adequately 
remedy and respond to such crises.266 Third, informal rulemaking 
is more democratically accountable and legitimate.267 Having § 553 
fashion). 
260  Lubbers, supra note 181, at 126–27.
261  Id. 
262  See Gibson, supra note 33, at 433 (attributing the problem of “greenwashing” to the lack of 
adequate enforcement of the “green guides”). 
263  See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 Duke L.J. 
1385, 1440 (1992).
264  Telephone Interview with David Vladeck, former Director of the Federal Trade Commission’s 
Bureau of Consumer Protection (Oct. 3, 2012).
265  See supra notes 211–13 and accompanying text. In crafting its consent orders, the Commission 
is not restricted to the “narrow lane of a respondent’s past actions;” it may “close all roads to 
the prohibited goal, so that its order may not be bypassed with impunity.” FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 
343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952); In the Matter of POM Wonderful LLC, No. 9344, 2013 WL 268926, at *65 
n.37 (F.T.C. Jan. 6, 2013) (applying the consent order any other food, drug, or dietary supplement 
products sold by POM and Roll Global, a separate company owned by the same trust).
266  Telephone Interview with David Vladeck, former Director of the Federal Trade Commission’s 
Bureau of Consumer Protection (Oct. 3, 2012). 
267  While the FTC does issue guidelines through notice-and-comment, which may enhance their 
“substantive impact,” the FTC is not bound to these interpretations and the adjudications largely 
form the policy. See Guardian Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp, 589 F.2d 
658, 666, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that an agency pronouncement is not a binding regulation 
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rulemaking authority allows all parties to assist the FTC in efficiently 
and fairly developing an industry-wide rule.268 The result is a quantum 
of certainty which better enables regulated entities to act without fear 
of sudden penalization for practices whose legality can be obfuscated 
by the informational opacity that can often define policymaking 
through adjudications and guidelines.269 Otherwise, some companies 
can find themselves facing an enforcement action based on a policy 
that an agency does not fully articulate until the commencement of the 
enforcement process.270 In short, clarity, fairness, deterrence, process, 
efficiency, and broad relief are often victims of a regulatory scheme 
devoid of informal rulemaking.271 
The acceptance of the status quo may also shift the balance of power 
to those advancing a dogmatic laissez-faire conception of regulation 
and the administrative state.272 This would be yet another defeat to 
those who view regulatory agencies such as the FTC as an ancillary 
yet ameliorative force in the market.273 The notion that deliberative 
decisionmaking through adjudicative hearings is an empowering 
vehicle that produces better regulation is fraught with risk. In the 
regulatory context, it is premised on, at best, a quixotic notion of parity 
in participatory capacity, or, at worst, the sophistries of scheming 
lobbyists.274 Regardless of the basis, the accretions of overly-circumspect 
simply because it may have “some substantive impact, as long it ‘leaves the administrator free 
to exercise his informed discretion”); Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 57 
Fed. Reg. 36,363, 36,364 (Aug. 13, 1992) (“conduct inconsistent with the positions articulated in 
these guides may result in corrective action by the Commission . . . .”) (emphasis added); Susan E. 
Dudley & Jerry Brito, Regulation: A Primer 39 (2d ed. 2012) (“businesses are guided by the kind 
of cases an agency brings.”); John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 893, 919 
(2004) (“a policy statement must genuinely leave the agency free to exercise discretion.”). 
268  See The FTC’s Enforcement Tools against Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices in Financial Products 
& Services and other Sectors Before the S. Subcomm. on Consumer Prot., Prod. Safety, & Ins. of the S. 
Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 111th Cong. 9 (2010) (statement of Dee Pridgen).
269  See Richard J. Pierce, Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity on the District of 
Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 Duke L.J. 300, 308 (1984) (arguing 
that rulemaking produces “much clearer rules” than adjudications; supra notes 211–13, 265. 
270  See supra notes 211–13 and accompanying text; David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative 
Rules, and the Perils of the Shortcut, 120 Yale L.J. 276, 315 (2010) (finding that in two cases, Shalala 
v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87 (1995) and United States v. Cinemark U.S.A., Inc., 348 F.3d 
569 (6th Cir. 2003), both courts underscored that the agency could have advanced a reasonable 
interpretation of its underlying statute for the first time during the enforcement process without 
publishing any sort of rule in advance).
271  Telephone Interview with David Vladeck, former Director of the Federal Trade Commission’s 
Bureau of Consumer Protection (Oct. 3, 2012).
272  Thomas O. McGarity, The Expanded Debate over the Future of the Administrative State, 63 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 1463, 1484–91 (1996) (describing the characteristics of “radical anti-interventionists”). 
273  See The Federal Trade Commission’s Enforcement Tools against Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices 
in Financial Products & Services and other Sectors Before the S. Subcomm. on Consumer Prot., Prod. 
Safety, & Ins. of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 111th Cong. 9 (2010) (statement of Dee 
Pridgen).
274  See ABA, Report Of The Section Concerning FTC Trade Regulation Rulemaking Procedures Pursuant 
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regulatory principles by some center-left bureaucrats and eminent 
scholars,275 and the unremitting de-regulatory crusade led by the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, which champions hyper-formalization as a 
more subtle means of achieving its objective,276 help erode rulemaking’s 
already-infirmed foundation in two ways. 
First, by failing to take into account the inherent discrepancy in 
participatory capacity of the regulated and the beneficiaries of regulation, 
the deliberative process becomes more of a forum to indict policy rather 
than resolve issues of material fact.277 Second, as a corollary, because the 
process does not effectively empower the intended beneficiaries, the 
remaining justification is sui generis solicitude for regulated industries. 
This may help to further shift the primary focus of rulemaking from 
treating or curing a problem to not “burdening” the very entities 
complicit in the creation or continuation of that problem, which is 
essentially the rationalization for a disproportionately market-based 
approach to administrative governance.278 The very same principle 
that impels critics of judicial interference of agency action applies 
here. That is, the public interest in avoiding delay in implementing 
the law—the regulation of unfair or deceptive acts or practices—far 
outweighs the short-term private interest—expense and inconvenience 
of compliance.279 The only difference here is that the culpability 
To The Magnuson-Moss Act, 49 Antitrust L.J. 347 (Feb. 7, 1980); infra note 276.
275  See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, The Expanded Debate over the Future of the Administrative State, 
63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1463, 1502 (1996) (characterizing Cass Sunstein, former head of the Office of 
Management and Budget for most of President Obama’s first term, as someone sympathetic to 
more “deliberative” administrative procedure); Brad Plumer, Is the White House Delaying Too 
Many Health and Safety Rules?, Wash. Post Wonk Blog (June 11, 2013, 3:35 PM), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/06/11/why-is-the-white-house-delaying-so-
many-safety-and-environmental-rules/ (noting that “OIRA took an average of sixty-nine days to 
review ‘economically significant rules,’ a longer wait than any year since 1994”); Kate Sheppard, 
Former EPA Climate Adviser Rips Obama Over Environmental Regulations, Mother Jones (Apr. 4, 
2013, 9:33 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2013/04/former-epa-climate-adviser-
rips-obama-admins-regulatory-approach (interviewing Professor and former Senior Climate 
Policy Counsel at the EPA, Lisa Heinzerling, who characterized the Obama Administration’s 
OMB as, in some ways, more aggressive than previous administrations and “notably aggressive” 
for a Democratic administration). 
276  See The Views of the Administration on Regulatory Reform: An Update: Hearing Before the H. Comm. 
on Energy & Commerce, H. Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations 112 Cong. 13–14 (2011) (statement 
of William L. Kovacs, Senior Vice President, Environment, Technology & Regulatory Affairs U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce) (urging Congress to universalize “hybrid’ rulemaking, i.e., hearings with 
cross-examination, for all “major rules and guidance”); Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, 
The DC Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 Sup. Ct. Rev. 345, 403, 406 (explaining why hybrid 
rulemaking is “so well insulated from effective criticism:” “An incumbent can be excoriated by his 
opponent in the next election for permitting X million dollars to be slashed from the budget of the 
new and highly popular Federal Happiness Commission. The criticism has a good deal less bite 
when it degenerates into a debate over what procedures are appropriate.”). 
277  See Grisinger, supra note 14, and supra notes 128–143 and accompanying text.
278  Id. 
279  See Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass’n, 387 U.S. 167 (1967) (Fortas, J ., concurring and dissenting) 
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rests with Congress’s decision to give regulated entities access to an 
extensive platform where they can unduly undermine valid agency 
action. Such a victory may prove pyrrhic for opponents of informal 
rulemaking, however, if they find that they have been “squeezing the 
balloon of bureaucratic arbitrariness at one point, only to have it pop 
out somewhere else.”280
B. Proposal: Dual Track
A more appealing model of policymaking may lie in the corners of 
ACUS’s 1972 report, and Congress’s original construction of the Mag-
Moss Act.281 The report recommended that Congress ordinarily should 
not further engraft mandatory procedures onto § 553;282 Congress should 
never require trial-type procedures for resolving questions of policy 
or general fact (in contrast to “specific” or “adjudicative” fact);283 and 
agencies should decide, in light of the needs of particular proceedings, 
whether to employ additional procedures, such as hearings.284 
Reconciling these recommendations with the reality of Mag-Moss 
warrants a bifurcation of FTC informal rulemaking that would operate 
on a dual-track system in appropriate situations. Affected parties 
would continue to resolve underlying questions of “adjudicative fact” 
through mandatory Mag-Moss procedure. First, however, if the FTC 
does not find there to be sufficient adjudicative fact to necessitate Mag-
Moss procedure, the parties alleging the proposed rule implicates 
adjudicative facts integral to the rulemaking would bear the burden 
of making such a showing through an expedited process and in 
a non-adversarial setting before an FTC administrative law judge 
(ALJ). If the ALJ finds that the parties preponderantly evidenced the 
existence of such adjudicative facts, the parties would be entitled to 
the “full panoply” of Mag-Moss procedure and the finding would 
be non-appealable.285 Therein, the party or parties would attempt to 
prevent their potential inclusion in the rule’s ambit by, for example, 
(excoriating the majority’s decision to permit a pre-enforcement injunction where the regulated 
only claimed a generalized grievance); Cross, supra note 32, at 1019 (arguing that the “shadow 
of judicial review” has a pervasive effect on agency “decisionmaking, and in turn can have a 
substantial adverse effect on public welfare, costing the public the benefits of regulation, including 
lives saved”).
280  Antonin Scalia, Back to Basics: Making Law Without Making Rules, 5 Reg. 25, 28 (1981); see supra 
notes 211–13, 265, 270.
281  ACUS, Recommendation 72-5, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability, 
38 Fed. Reg. 19,782 (1973).
282  Id. ¶ 2; see also Lubbers, supra note 181, at 283. 
283  ACUS Recommendation 72-5, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability, 
38 Fed. Reg. 19,782 (1973).
284  Id. at ¶ 5. 
285  An adverse finding, however, would be appealable to the Commission. 
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formally demonstrating how their act or practice materially differs 
from the one the rule seeks to or may proscribe. Simultaneously, the 
policy parameters comprising the thrust of the proposed rule would be 
constituted through § 553 notice-and-comment. If the FTC promulgates 
the rule first, then whatever party-factual issues are resolved through 
the Mag-Moss track would automatically obtain in the final rule in the 
form of an amendment forgoing the comment period. 
Admittedly, this proposal does not liberate the FTC from many of 
the same burdens that plague the status quo. Such a proposal would 
likely fail to significantly reduce the expenditure of agency resources. 
Moreover, the line between adjudicative fact and policy is often nebulous 
and not impervious to manipulation. Nevertheless, even a flawed 
dual track system could assist in impeding co-optation of additional 
procedures to influence policy, while retaining robust procedural 
protections for innocent actors. It dispenses relief to consumers more 
efficiently without sacrificing a pre-litigation venue to contest over-
inclusive rules that may be based on distortions of adjudicative facts. 
Finally, if this modest proposal is still not congressionally palatable, 
the courts should enforce the FTC’s procedural rule restricting 
cross-examination and rebuttal evidence to adjudicative fact. Courts 
have long differentiated between adjudicative and legislative fact, 
and the distinction is relatively well established in judicial, as well 
as administrative, proceedings.286 While this relief may not be 
commensurate to the ailment, it could optimize Mag-Moss enough to 
entice the Commission to resume some independent rulemaking.287 
Conclusion
Far from mooting the issue, Congress’s failure to restore APA 
rulemaking procedural power by one vote288 highlights the importance 
and practicality of reforming Mag-Moss. The current regulatory 
regime thwarts the benefits of rulemaking—fairness and efficiency—
by mandating procedure redolent of a court of law that determines the 
factual transpirations of a small set of parties, rather than an agency 
process that is designed as a functional analogue to prospective 
legislative actions. This superfluous check on the FTC’s protective 
function has only muddied the regulatory waters. Mag-Moss has 
rendered independent rulemaking moribund, forcing the FTC to 
continually play catch-up by imploring Congress on ad-hoc bases to 
286  Richard J. Pierce, Seven Ways to Deossify Rulemaking, 47 Admin. L. Rev. 59, 64 (1995).
287  Kenneth Culp Davis, Richard J. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise § 7.7, 341 (3d ed. 1994).
288  Telephone Interview with David Vladeck, former Director of the Federal Trade Commission’s 
Bureau of Consumer Protection (Oct. 3, 2012).
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promulgate rules under § 553. Alternatively, the FTC must rely on 
enforcement actions, positioning adjudicative regulation in a starring 
position, when it was the very excess of adjudication and its potential 
for arbitrariness that prompted Congress to pass the APA in the first 
place. 
Given the narrowness of defeat, proposing a more moderate 
prescription that utilizes both APA and Mag-Moss procedure and is 
consonant with congressional intent may have the broader attraction 
necessary for congressional approval. Certainly, its flexible process 
is more consistent with the traditional principles of rulemaking 
procedure. Of course, comporting with traditions of rulemaking will 
not placate its chronic critics or de-politicize the immutably politicized 
nature of governance. But de-formalizing an inappropriately hyper-
formal process does stand a better chance of re-equipping an agency to 
regulate with greater balance. To do otherwise, is to “exalt form over 
necessity.”289
289  See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947). 
